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FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL: 
PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, 
AND INALIENABILITY RULES IN TENTH 
AMENDMENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
ERIN RYAN" 
This Article explores the consequences for good governance of 
poorly constructed legal infrastructure in the Tenth Amend-
ment context, and recommends a simple jurisprudential fix: 
exchanging a property rule for the inalienability remedy rule 
that the Supreme Court used to protect the anti-
commandeering entitlement in New York v. United States. 
Grounded in a values-based theory of American federalism, 
it shows how the New York inalienability rule unnecessarily 
removes tools for resolving interjurisdictional quagmires-
exemplified by the radioactive waste capacity problem at the 
heart of the New York litigation-by prohibiting novel forms 
of state-federal bargaining. 
In New York, the Court held that Congress lacked the au-
thority to bind a state's participation in a regulatory scheme 
even if state officials had effectively waived Tenth Amend-
ment-based objections during consensual negotiations with 
the federal government. In so doing, the Court articulated a 
reasonable entitlement to federal noninterference protected 
by an unreasonable inalienability rule. It is an inalienabili-
ty rule because any number of collective-action problems 
would prevent the negotiated transfer of the entitlement ex-
cept through representation by elected officials. It is unrea-
sonable because the intergovernmental partnerships thus 
thwarted would help resolve pressing interjurisdictional 
problems without offending the Constitution. Indeed, the 
underlying values of federalism that give meaning to the 
Tenth Amendment would be better served by allowing a state 
to decide for itself whether to hold or trade its entitlement. 
*Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William & 
Mary; J.D., Harvard Law School, M.A., Wesleyan University, B.A. Harvard Uni-
versity. For their critical comments and suggestions, I am indebted to Nestor Da-
vidson, Neal Devins, Dave Douglas, Bob Ellickson, Rick Hills, Bob Percival, J.B. 
Ruhl, Joe Singer, and Tim Zick, as well as the participants of the Property Works 
in Progress Conference and Virginia Junior Faculty Forum. I also thank my re-
search assistant, Jessie Coulter, for her invaluable contributions, and my new 
son, Dylan, for his continuing inspiration to get governance right. 
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Focusing on the facts and legacy of the New York decision, 
this Article concludes that, although its inalienability rule is 
defensible in exclusively state or federal jurisdictional con-
texts, it is dubious in contexts that require regulatory atten-
tion at both the local and national level. A property rule 
that would enable states to bargain with their anti-
commandeering entitlement would not offend the touchstone 
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has always been 
the prevention of federal coercion of the states. A pro-
bargaining property rule would be more consistent with the 
rest of the Court's federalism jurisprudence, more faithful to 
the full panoply of values that undergird American federal-
ism, and better for state and federal governance in difficult 
interjurisdictional contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF LEGAL RULES 
As climate change, war in the Middle East, and the price of 
oil focus American determination to move beyond fossil fuels, 
nuclear power has resurfaced as a possible alternative. But 
energy reform efforts may be stalled by an unlikely policy dead-
lock stemming from a structural technicality in an aging Su-
preme Court decision: New York v. United States, I which set 
forth the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule and 
ushered in the New Federalism era in 1992.2 This dry techni-
cality also poses ongoing regulatory obstacles in such critical 
interjurisdictional contexts as stormwater management, cli-
mate regulation, disaster response, and national security.3 
Such is the enormous power hidden in the infrastructure of le-
gal rules, including the property, liability, and inalienability 
remedy rules that protect normative legal entitlements. 
This Article explores the consequences for good governance 
of poorly constructed infrastructure in the Tenth Amendment 
context, and recommends a relatively simple jurisprudential 
fix: exchanging a property rule for the inalienability remedy 
rule that the Court used to protect the anti-commandeering en-
titlement in New York. Grounded in a values-based theory of 
American federalism, the Article shows how the New York in-
alienability rule unnecessarily removes tools for resolving in-
terjurisdictional quagmires by prohibiting useful forms of 
I. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
2. Broadly, the New Federalism refers to a political movement that gathered 
force over the 1980s by advocating renewed respect for distinct spheres of state 
and federal power. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 
(2000) ("The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local." (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995))). 
In the landmark New Federalism cases that followed, the Supreme Court rejected 
a series of federal laws held to transgress this reinvigorated boundary, beginning 
with its holding in New York that the federal government may not "commandeer" 
the states by compelling them to regulate. 505 U.S. at 161. For a detailed review 
of the Court's New Federalism Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, see Erin Ryan, 
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Inter-
jurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 539-67 (2007). The present Article 
draws some of its conceptual vocabulary from the broader treatment of federalism 
theory in this earlier piece. 
3. Ryan, supra note 2, at 567-96 (describing how the New Federalism Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence has created problems for interjurisdictional gover-
nance in these contexts); see Christopher Dickey, The Spymaster of New York, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40-41 (reporting on conflicts between the CIA and 
the NYPD over counter-terrorism intelligence gathering). 
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state-federal bargaining.4 The collective-action problem at the 
heart of the New York litigation-equitable radioactive waste 
management-is exactly this sort of quagmire, as demonstrat-
ed by a new round of lawsuits and proposed legislation that 
prove it unresolved all these decades later. 
The facts of the New York saga are compelling, but the sto-
ry really begins with the under-sung significance of legal infra-
structure. Any given legal rule really implies two-the norma-
tive element of the rule ("no parking"), and the legal 
consequences that follow when the rule is violated (if you park 
there anyway, will the government: fine you? tow your car? re-
voke your registration?). The normative element is easily rec-
ognized and amply debated during the rulemaking, whether 
the rule is of legislative, administrative, or judicial origins. 
Meanwhile, the remedial element may languish in relative 
anonymity-at least until second-order conflicts arise following 
general acceptance of the normative rule. (For example, the 
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non lredas5 
had been long established before jurists began to debate 
whether a losing private nuisance defendant should cease the 
harmful use or merely compensate the suffering plaintiff.6) Yet 
it is the combination of both elements that orders critical as-
pects of our lives-ranging from private law transactions over 
the sale of a house, to public law transactions over government 
condemnation of the house, all the way to state and federal 
bargaining over how best to regulate radioactive waste near 
that house. 
This dimension of legal architecture was first explored by 
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in their iconic Harvard 
4. In previous work, I have argued that the best way to understand federal-
ism is in terms of the good governance values it seeks to foster, primarily in terms 
of the checks and balances between local and national levels of government that 
safeguard individual rights, the benefits of variation and innovation that accrue 
to localism, the need for governmental accountability that enables meaningful 
democratic participation, and the synergistic problem-solving capacity that ac-
cords a federal system. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 596-658. In adjudicating diffi-
cult jurisdictional issues that raise questions of federalism, faithfulness to these 
values should be the touchstone. See id. 
5. "Use your property so as not to damage another's." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1757 app. B (8th ed. 2004). 
6. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (depart-
ing from the traditional approach of prohibiting nuisance harms outright to allow 
a defendant cement company to continue its harmful operations, as long as it 
compensated neighboring plaintiffs for the harm); see also RESTATE:-.IE:-."T 
(SECO:\'D) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1979) (adopting the Boomer approach for eva-
luating nuisance remedies). 
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Law Review article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of The Cathedral, which describes legal 
rules as pairings of an entitlement (designating which of the 
conflicting parties will prevail in a given scenario of legal con-
flict) with a second-order rule indicating how that entitlement 
will be vindicated if challenged,? One View of the Cathedral 
("Cathedral") identifies three approaches taken by legal rules 
to protect the entitlements they establish: the "property rule," 
by which the entitlement is treated as an item of property that 
the holder may choose to trade or sell to a competitor; the "lia-
bility rule," by which the competitor may usurp the entitlement 
over the holder's protest so long as the loss is compensated; and 
the more sparingly used "inalienability rule," which forbids 
shifting an entitlement from its assigned holder regardless of 
the parties' wishes.8 It details different circumstances in which 
each approach will most faithfully serve the intended purposes 
of the rule,9 and suggests that entitlements and remedies are 
not always well matched in this regard.lO 
Thus, although the substance of the entitlement may 
preoccupy rulemakers at the outset, it is often this secondary 
aspect of the rule that becomes the more persisting subject of 
legal controversy. Many authors have employed the Cathedral 
framework of analysis to critique underperforming legal rules 
in the common law contexts that Calabresi and Melamed ad-
dressed directly, 11 but others have shown that the framework 
proves robust even at the constitutional level, where the nor-
mative elements of legal rules are often more clear from the 
7. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972). 
8. Id. at 1092-93. 
9. These circumstances often relate to confidence levels in the rulemakers' 
assumptions about the initial allocation of entitlements. For example, property 
rules enable efficient bargaining between competitors when the initial allocation 
of entitlements is uncertain, liability rules ensure socially desirable transfer 
against holdouts when the least cost avoider is uncertain, and inalienability rules 
protect what the authors call a "moralism," or a policymaking consensus that a 
preordained outcome is worth the resulting sacrifice in autonomy and efficiency 
values. Id. at 1112. 
10. Id. at 111~24 (discussing how different remedy rules may advance differ-
ent goals associated with the substantive entitlement). 
11. A recent sampling includes: Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements 
as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 
(1997); Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008). 
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text than remedial elements that courts must sometimes infer 
jurisprudentially. 12 From ongoing friction over the explicit lia-
bility rule in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (enabling 
the state to condemn private property for public use so long as 
market value is paid) 13 to debate over the coercive overuse of 
property rule-enabled plea bargains (alleged to distort the 
criminal law bargaining process to the point of vitiating the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial), 14 many of today's most 
compelling constitutional controversies involve the second-
order, remedial aspect of the operative legal rule. Constitu-
tional federalism now joins these ranks, as the casual insertion 
into New York of an ill-considered inalienability rule-one that 
obstructs intergovernmental bargaining around uncertain 
Tenth Amendment entitlements15-threatens to further ex-
acerbate regulatory dilemmas that require the negotiation of 
unique state-federal partnerships. 
A most alarming example is the crisis that first led to the 
New York controversy twenty-five years ago: our seriously 
dwindling capacity for handling radioactive waste that nobody 
wants in the backyard. The entrenched problem of safe and 
equitable radioactive waste management is again making 
headlines, thanks to the 2008 closure to national waste traffic 
of the Barnwell disposal site in South Carolina that had indi-
12. E.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Trans-
action Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2005); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, 
and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1143, 1144 
(1999). 
13. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Roderick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (2008) (critiquing the eminent domain liability rule that 
under-compensates owners with market price for property they did not wish to 
part with in the first place, even at market rates). 
14. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Pro-
secutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
851, 864 (1995) (observing that prosecutors sometimes overcharge a defendant in 
the absence of sufficient evidence to extract a plea bargain for a lesser offense); 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1909-10 (1992) (noting that most legal scholars find plea bargaining "both 
inefficient and unjust"); Joseph P. Fried, New York Judge Rejects Death Penalty 
Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at A1 (reporting on judicial concerns that 
plea provisions of the death penalty law allow prosecutors to coerce guilty pleas 
from capital defendants). 
15. See infra Part II.C (explicating the inalienability rule effected by the 
Court's conclusion that New York State could not have consented to the Act's re-
quirement (that it either site a disposal facility or take title to the radioactive 
waste generated within its borders) on grounds that states can never consent to 
be bound by this kind offederallaw). 
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rectly inspired the New York dispute in the first place.16 
Barnwell had been processing the majority of the nation's low-
level radioactive waste for the better part of the last half-
century, as one of only three sites nationwide accepting this 
most common form of radioactive waste (produced by the use of 
nuclear material in commercial applications ranging from pow-
er plants to consumer products).17 South Carolina resented be-
coming a dumping ground for other states' toxic waste and first 
threatened to close the Barnwell doors in 1979, prompting a 
national panic and Congress's first attempts to resolve the 
problem. 18 Respectful of the federalism implications of creating 
a new national regulatory regime, Congress adopted a state-led 
approach proposed by the National Governors Association 
when it passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
("the Act")19 and subsequent amendments, which required each 
state to take responsibility for disposing of the waste produced 
within its borders by a set deadline (or "take title" to that 
waste).20 
But in an effort to make its own rhetorical point about fe-
deralism, the Supreme Court eviscerated the Act's "take-title" 
enforcement provision in New York, holding that Congress 
lacked the authority to bind a state's participation in the plan 
even if state officials had effectively waived Tenth Amend-
ment-based objections during consensual negotiations with the 
federal government.21 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor 
explained that a state may not waive its anti-commandeering 
entitlement (prohibiting the federal government from compel-
ling the state to regulate) because the Tenth Amendment pro-
tects rights held not by the state qua state but by its citizens as 
individuals.22 In so doing, the Court articulated a reasonable 
16. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150 (1992) (describing how 
South Carolina's earlier threats to close Barnwell to national traffic led to the 
passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act); Judy Fahys, Industry 
Recipe: Diluted N- Waste, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 28, 2008 (reporting on the closure 
of Barnwell to all but three other states as of July 2008). 
17. See, e.g., Stevenson Swanson, Clock Is Ticking on Available Sites for Dis-
posing Nuclear Waste: States Seek New Places to Bury Radioactive Debris, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 14, 1993, at 13. 
18. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text. 
19. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 
(1980) (current version at 42 U.S. C. §§ 2021h-2021d (2006)). 
20. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 § 5(d)(2)(C), 
Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1850, declared unconstitutional by New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
21. New York, 505 U.S. at 182. 
22. Id. 
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entitlement to federal noninterference protected by an unrea-
sonable inalienability rule. Prohibiting state government from 
bargaining with the entitlement creates an inalienability rule 
because any number of collective-action problems would pre-
vent the negotiated transfer of the entitlement except through 
representation by elected officials.23 It is unreasonable because 
the intergovernmental partnerships thus thwarted would help 
resolve pressing interjurisdictional problems without offending 
the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, underlying values of American 
federalism that give meaning to the Tenth Amendment would 
be better served by allowing a state to decide for itself whether 
to hold or trade its entitlement. 
New York's subtle inalienability rule attracted much less 
attention than the substantive anti-commandeering rule that it 
protected, but the consequences of inalienability are currently 
front-page news, now that Barnwell is finally closed to national 
waste shipments, three additional decades of waste have accu-
mulated, and no new disposal capacity to absorb it has been 
created since New York extracted what teeth in the Act might 
have compelled it. The capacity crisis has taken on added ur-
gency as policymakers revisit nuclear power as an alternative 
source of energy, especially now that the only disposal site ac-
cepting nationwide waste has contracted to also accept ship-
ments from Europe. 24 Fears that this would further strain do-
mestic capacity prompted protest from the other states in its 
regional compact, bills in both houses of Congress to prevent 
the importation of internationally produced waste, and a pro-
posal under consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion to reduce the capacity crisis simply by shifting more toxic 
forms of waste into less stringently regulated categories.25 No 
thanks to the New York inalienability rule, the low-level ra-
dioactive waste crisis languishes with no solution in sight. 
This Article explores how Calabresi and Melamed's Cathe-
dral framework can help us understand the interjurisdictional 
gridlock that has arisen under the New Federalism Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence in infrastructural terms-and more 
importantly, how to resolve it at the infrastructural level. It 
23. See infra Part II.C. For an analogous argument in the property law con-
text, see Richard A. Epstein, Comment, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the 
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1367 (1982) (arguing that a property 
owner's ability to hold out is one of our legal system's "essential strengths"). 
24. See infra text accompanying note 180. 
25. See infra Part II.D. 
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proceeds from a theoretical account of the Tenth Amendment 
as the guardian of American federalism by vindicating the dual 
sovereignty directive, charged with protecting the principles of 
good government that underlie our system of dual sovereign-
ty.26 These include the maintenance of checks and balances be-
tween state and federal power to safeguard individual rights, 
the protection of local autonomy to promote interjurisdictional 
variation and innovation, the enhancement of public accounta-
bility to enable meaningful democratic participation by voters, 
and the facilitation of synergistic approaches to regulatory 
problem solving that accord the federalist structure.27 By this 
account (which I have outlined in previous work), the Tenth 
Amendment polices regulatory activity at the margins of state 
and federal authority for impermissible compromises of these 
fundamental federalism values.28 This account departs from 
the New Federalism's idealization of a bright-line boundary be-
tween mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal authori-
ty, out of recognition for the thorny regulatory problems-like 
radioactive waste management-that do not fit precisely with-
in one sphere or the other.29 
26. Ryan, supra note 2, at 518-22 (reviewing the Constitution's dual sove-
reignty directive and identifying ambiguities that require interpretation according 
to an extrinsic theoretical model of federalism). 
27. Id. at 596-628 (outlining the fundamental federalism values and discuss-
ing the tensions among them). The good governance values that undergird Amer-
ican federalism are well understood in previous federalism scholarship with the 
exception of the underappreciated problem-solving value, which arises from the 
subsidiarity ethic-that governance take place at the most local level possible, or 
that level with sufficient capacity to successfully address the problem at hand. Id. 
at 620-28. The problem-solving value is also indicated in the constitutional choice 
of a federal system after the failure of the decentralizing Articles of Confederation 
to realize efficient interstate commerce, to provide for the common defense, and to 
resolve interstate disputes. Id. at 619. James Madison invoked the problem-
solving value in defending the Constitution in the Federalist Papers, urging that 
the distribution of power it contemplated was needed to accomplish the goals of 
the new government: 
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, ... not that the people of 
America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the govern-
ments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, 
might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain digni-
ties and attributes of sovereignty? 
Id. at 621-22 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288-89 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
28. Id. at 644-62 (outlining the role of the Tenth Amendment within the Ba-
lanced Federalism theoretical model). 
29. Id. at 567-95 (describing how an interjurisdictional gray area betrays the 
New Federalism's preferred model of strict-separationist dual sovereignty); see 
also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
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Focusing on the facts and legacy of the New York decision, 
this Article concludes that although the inalienability rule is 
defensible in exclusively state or federal jurisdictional contexts, 
it is dubious in contexts that require regulatory attention at 
both the local and nationallevei.30 The failing interstate mar-
ket for radioactive waste disposal demonstrates the interjuris-
dictional dilemma: Congress could regulate the market under 
its commerce authority, but the siting of specific waste 
processing facilities must ultimately conform to state and local 
land-use laws that mediate impacts on local communities, mak-
ing it better resolved with the benefit of both federal and state 
expertise. In this "gray area" of overlapping local and national 
concern, state and federal regulators must find ways to work 
together-occasionally by negotiating partnerships that blur 
the bright-line boundary the New Federalism imagines be-
tween idealized spheres of exclusively state or federal 
jurisdiction. 3! 
In these negotiations, the media of exchange are the reci-
procal entitlements to sovereign authority and regulatory non-
interference delineated by the Tenth Amendment, which af-
firms that the Constitution delegates some forms of sovereign 
authority to the federal government while leaving others with 
the states.32 Entitlements to authority at the margin of this 
division were the bargaining chips at hand when the states ne-
gotiated with Congress to create the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act. However, the New York inalienability rule 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
813, 831-32, 938-39 (1998) (deeming the New Federalism's view of mutually ex-
clusive state and federal regulatory spheres "palpably untrue"); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180, 2196 (1998) (discussing the "outmoded" basis for the New Federalism 
dual sovereignty approach); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: 
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1564-66 (1994) (criti-
quing the New Federalism model's reliance on the territorial view of federalism). 
30. Ryan, supra note 2, at 572-84 (describing interjurisdictional regulatory 
problems); see also id. at 514, 570 (limiting the discussion of "regulatory problems" 
to the classic targets of administrative law, including "market failures, negative 
externalities, and other collective-action problems that individuals are ill-
equipped to resolve on their own"). 
31. See id. at 539-67 (reviewing how the Rehnquist Court's Tenth Amend-
ment and preemption jurisprudence reify a "strict separationist" ideal of New Fe-
deralism dual sovereignty). 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people."); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 519-20 (reviewing 
what is made certain and what is left unclear under the Tenth Amendment dual 
sovereignty directive). 
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makes such intergovernmental negotiation so much more diffi-
cult that none has occurred in the sixteen years since the rule 
toppled the last attempt, setting the stage for the renewed cri-
sis that is again demanding lawmakers' attention. 
Other efforts at interjurisdictional problem solving have 
also been stunted under the bright-line approach to segregat-
ing state and federal jurisdiction, leading to unnecessary regu-
latory uncertainty,33 gridlock,34 litigation,35 and even outright 
abdication.36 Because the New Federalism ideal does not re-
flect the jurisdictional realities of American governance, many 
scholars (myself included) have suggested that the Court turn 
to other models of federalism for inspiration. 37 However, this 
Article demonstrates that progress is attainable even within 
the existing New Federalism paradigm, simply by matching its 
normative Tenth Amendment rule with a more appropriate 
remedial rule. 
Specifically, the inalienability remedy should be replaced 
with a property rule, at least in the gray area. Enabling addi-
tional opportunities to bargain around New Federalism's bright 
line of jurisdictional separation could alleviate some of the ob-
stacles that have plagued interjurisdictional problem solving 
since New York was decided. Indeed, in prohibiting bargained-
for state waiver of the anti-commandeering entitlement, New 
33. For example, much regulatory uncertainty currently attends wetlands 
regulation. See infra note 235 (discussing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 731-32 (2006)). 
34. A prime example is that regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste. See infra Part II.D. 
35. One example of such litigation was the Tenth Amendment challenge to 
the state-federal partnership at the heart of the Clean Water Act's Phase II 
Stormwater Rule. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text. 
36. The failed response to Hurricane Katrina has been so characterized. E.g., 
Peggy Noonan, The Scofflaw Swimmer: Government Takes Too Much Authority 
and Not Enough Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.opinion 
journal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110007328 ("No one took charge. Thus the 
postgame commentary in which everyone blamed someone else: The mayor fum-
bled the ball, the governor didn't call the play, the president didn't have a ground 
game."). 
37. E.g., Hills, supra note 29, at 816-17, 938-44 (arguing for local autonomy 
on a functional basis); John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democ-
racy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (2006) (ad-
vancing a model of integrated federalism); Ryan, supra note 2, at 644-65 (advo-
cating a model of Balanced Federalism that better mediates between competing 
federalism values in the interjurisdictional gray area); Robert A. Schapiro, Poly-
phonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
1409, 1466-68 (1999) (proposing that federal and state courts participate together 
in developing constitutional law). 
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York's inalienability rule ironically extinguishes what would 
otherwise be the New Federalism's most promising means of 
advancing interjurisdictional collaboration in a way that would 
honor all federalism values. As with all bright-line rules, one 
potential advantage of the New Federalism's jurisdictional line 
is the clarity it creates about who has what for the purposes of 
state-federal bargaining. Applying Coasian insight, bargaining 
protects us against errors in assigning the initial legal entitle-
ment under conditions of uncertainty,38 and uncertainty is a 
serious concern when drawing a line of jurisdictional separa-
tion through the haze of overlapping state and federal interests 
at the margin between them. The jurisdictional clarity New 
Federalism seeks to protect could thus be harnessed to facili-
tate negotiations that may be needed when state and federal 
regulators must collaborate at the margins of their jurisdic-
tional allocation. But the inalienability rule chills bargaining 
around that line, unnecessarily abrogating the possibility of 
consensual state-federal partnerships in the tricky interjuris-
dictional contexts that need it most. 
Worse, it does so without a satisfying rationale from the 
Court. The majority suggested that state sovereign authority 
is an inherently unwaivable entitlement,39 but this stands in 
stark contrast to other federalism entitlements to the same au-
thority that are protected by property rules, such as the waiva-
ble Eleventh Amendment entitlement to state sovereign im-
munity and trades negotiated under the federal spending 
power.40 The majority also worried that elected representa-
tives' interests could stray dangerously from those of their con-
stituents, but this generic problem of representational democ-
racy is actually least pressing in the Tenth Amendment 
context, where citizen and representative interests substantial-
ly overlap.41 The bargaining medium is the very state sove-
reignty that empowers even the most self-interested state rep-
resentatives, who are unlikely to bargain away their own base 
38. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) 
(arguing that efficient results can be achieved when parties can bargain, so long 
as transaction costs are low). As with all bright-line rules, one potential advan-
tage of the New Federalism's jurisdictional line is the clarity it creates about who 
has what for the purposes of state-federal bargaining. Whether or not the line is 
correctly drawn, at least the parties are on clear notice about which level of gov-
ernment has been designated which jurisdictional entitlements. 
39. See infra Part III. B. 
40. See infra Part IILB.l. 
41. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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of authority unless it is the only way to meet important inter-
ests of their constituents.42 
In contrast, a property rule that would enable states to 
bargain with their entitlement would not offend the touchstone 
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has always been the 
prevention of federal "coercion" of the states.43 The consensual 
nature of state-federal negotiation means that each state would 
decide for itself whether to alienate the entitlement in each in-
stance. In this respect, a property rule approach would better 
serve the federalism values of local autonomy (locating deci-
sional authority at the local level), interjurisdictional innova-
tion (allowing for the diversity of response that engenders the 
federalism "laboratory of ideas"), and problem-solving synergy 
(fostering intergovernmental partnerships to cope with interju-
risdictional problems). It would offer sufficient protection for 
check-and-balance federalism values, because a state will not 
bargain against its powerful interest in maintaining the bal-
ance of state and federal power unless offsetting, problem-
solving values justify the trade-off-as all of the states believed 
when they negotiated the terms of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act. Indeed, bargaining is a time-honored 
means-and perhaps the only means-of enabling parties who 
lack consensus on the perfect to move forward toward the good, 
relying on the contract law presumption that the parties them-
selves are best situated to evaluate whether the deal serves 
their true interests.44 
By prohibiting state-federal bargaining around a very un-
certain line, the inalienability rule ossifies errors in the initial 
allocation of jurisdictional entitlements and subverts the role of 
the Tenth Amendment by undermining the very federalism 
values it exists to protect. When a remedy rule proves so 
sweeping that it threatens to reconfigure the substantive 
meaning of the normative rule it protects, that is a strong sig-
nal that normative and remedial elements have been mis-
matched at the level of legal infrastructure-and that interven-
42. See infra Part III.B.2. 
43. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992). 
44. Even federalism scholars concerned about the potential for state-federal 
collusion around federalism constraints concede that the commandeering context 
is the least vulnerable to this problem. See John 0. McGinnis & llya Somin, Fe-
deralism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 
Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 119 (2004) (warning that states may collude with the federal 
government in undermining federalism constraints, but acknowledging that this 
is least likely in the context of commandeering). 
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tion is warranted. A pro-bargaining property rule would be 
more consistent with the rest of the Court's federalism juri-
sprudence, more faithful to the full panoply of values that un-
dergird American federalism, and better for state and federal 
governance in the gray area. Part I reviews the Cathedral 
framework's exegesis of legal infrastructure, and addresses its 
application in the context of constitutional federalism. Part II 
explores how the New York case establishes the inalienability 
of the anti-commandeering entitlement, and the consequences 
of inalienability in gray areas of interjurisdictional concern. 
Part III proposes the change to a property rule approach and 
refutes the Court's rationale for the New York inalienability 
rule as both theoretically and pragmatically weak. 
I. THE CATHEDRAL FRAMEWORK 
Legal rules structure civil society, but their own architec-
ture is easily overlooked, sometimes at great societal cost. This 
Part introduces the Cathedral framework as a way of under-
standing legal infrastructure, and the various benefits that 
architects of legal rules may secure in choosing among the dif-
ferent remedial alternatives for vindicating the normative en-
titlement at the heart of a given legal rule. Mter reviewing 
how scholars have applied the framework in other public law 
contexts, it explores how the Supreme Court has applied the 
framework inconsistently across distinct doctrinal realms with-
in its federalism jurisprudence. It also responds to potential 
skepticism about the applicability of the framework to federal-
ism bargaining, noting the ways that state-federal bargaining 
approximates private market bargaining even more closely 
than other forms of governmental bargaining. 
A. The Cathedral in Private Law Contexts 
The Cathedral framework draws from tort, property, and 
criminal law in unifying a set of conceptual tools for choosing 
among different approaches to protecting the assignment of le-
gal entitlements.45 As described above, legal rules mediate be-
tween parties with conflicting interests in some legal sphere, 
and a legal rule's first job is to decide which of the parties' in-
terests will be privileged as a substantive matter. In so doing, 
45. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1089-90. 
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the rule confers on the privileged party a legal entitlement-a 
right to do (or not do) something, or to have (or not have) some-
thing happen to her-be it the entitlement to exclude a compet-
itor from a given parcel of land, the entitlement to practice 
one's religion despite the neighbors' opposition, or the entitle-
ment to use a crosswalk without being run over by lawful au-
tomobile traffic. The second, less-celebrated job of the legal 
rule is to structure the scope of permissible transactions involv-
ing this assigned entitlement. To this end, as between the pri-
vileged holder and those with competing interests, the law will 
vindicate the entitlement in one of three ways: by a property 
rule, a liability rule, or an inalienability rule. 
If the entitlement is protected under a property rule, its 
holder has absolute power to convey the entitlement away for a 
satisfactory price. This approach treats the entitlement like an 
item of personal property, enabling the holder to protect it 
against all challengers or trade it on the open market at will. 
It represents the most common remedy rule in property law-
for example, governing most private real estate transactions, 
where an owner sells her house in the marketplace only if she 
so desires, and then on her own terms.46 
If the entitlement is protected under a liability rule, it may 
be purchased at an objectively determined price by the compet-
itor even without the holder's consent.47 This is the most com-
mon remedy rule in tort law-where accident victims are not 
usually given the ex ante opportunity to bargain away their en-
titlement not to be victims of negligently inflicted harm, but in 
which the law compensates them for the loss of that entitle-
ment by requiring the competitor (here, the tortfeasor) to com-
pensate them in the form of objectively determined damages. 
However, the liability rule has also gained traction in property 
and other areas of law under the influence of the Law and Eco-
nomics school, which suggests that legal rules promote general 
societal utility over individual autonomy in cases where hol-
douts or other collective-action problems could derail socially 
desirable outcomes. For example, in the landmark Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co.48 private nuisance decision, the court de-
parted from the traditional approach requiring abatement of 
the nuisance to protect the plaintiffs entitlement to be free of 
harm, and instead allowed a socially valuable factory use to 
46. Id. at 1092. 
47. Id. 
48. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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continue (because it paid taxes and employed many local resi-
dents) so long as it compensated neighboring homeowners for 
their losses. The Restatement of Torts now adopts the liability 
rule remedy for private nuisance.49 
The final approach is one of inalienability, by which the 
entitlement is held to rest where it is initially laid by the law, 
and any attempted transfer by either party is legally unenfor-
ceable.50 This is a common remedy rule in criminal law (where 
consent is not a defense to murder or statutory rape),5 1 but it is 
also found in other areas of law. For example, in the common 
law of property, the implied warranty of habitability establish-
es an entitlement to renters for a minimum standard of safety 
and sanitation in rental housing that cannot be negotiated 
away, even between a willing landlord and tenant happy to 
bargain for less safety at less rent.52 
Calabresi and Melamed propose various reasons for using 
property, liability, and inalienability rules to accomplish the 
goals of well-ordered legal rules. For example, they suggest 
that property rules be used whenever the cheapest cost avoider 
can be identified, because it enables interparty bargaining that 
ensures the entitlement ultimately reaches the most efficient 
destination even if an error is made in the initial assignment. 53 
The choice of to whom to assign the entitlement as an initial 
matter is still an important decision, of course, since it may 
create significant distributional consequences for the parties. 
However, even the procedural clarity yielded by property rules 
is subject to the usual caveats of the Coase Theorem's limiting 
assumptions,54 and so Calabresi and Melamed also note that 
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1979) (noting that "[i]t 
may be reasonable to continue an important activity if payment is made for the 
harm it is causing''). 
50. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1092-93. 
51. For example, Florida prohibits murder even when the victim consents. 
FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2007). Oregon does not allow persons under the age of eigh-
teen to consent to a sexual act. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(1)(a) (2007). 
52. Some jurisdictions describe the implied warranty of habitability as a co-
venant for basic rental housing services. E.g., Acad. Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 268 
A.2d 556, 559 (Essex County Ct. 1970) ("In a modern society one cannot be ex-
pected to live in a multi-storied apartment building without heat, hot water, gar-
bage disposal or elevator service. Failure to supply such things is a breach of the 
implied covenant of habitability."). 
53. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1118. The "cheapest cost avoider" 
refers to that party to a given conflict who is able to forestall the harm at issue at 
the lowest expense or with the least investment of resources. 
54. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 38, at 15-16 (assuming the absence of transac-
tion costs). 
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property rules can lead to inefficient results when transaction 
costs are high (especially when multiple parties are associated 
with classic collective-action problems, such as holdouts or free-
loaders). 55 
By contrast, liability rules are useful when there is uncer-
tainty at the outset about the identity of the cheapest cost 
avoider, and where transaction costs or collective-action prob-
lems would impede efficient bargaining over the entitlement.56 
In either case, the liability rule ensures that a socially desira-
ble transaction may proceed even if the entitlement holder pro-
tests 57-as does the law of eminent domain, which enables the 
government to condemn land for highways and airports by pay-
ing fair market value even if one or more of the owners of tar-
geted properties would rather not sell. However, liability rules 
can lead to troubling distributional effects (where the efficient 
result is partly determined by the parties' relative ability to 
pay), and can also create problems from an efficiency stand-
point. Specifically, the objectively determined price of the en-
titlement will only approximate its value to the unwilling en-
titlement holder, which can complicate the realization of an 
efficient result through market-approximating mechanisms.58 
For example, the payment of fair market value for eminent 
domain condemnations is frequently criticized as under-
compensating unwilling property owners by definition, because 
if they really only valued the land at the prevailing market 
price, they presumably would have already sold it on the open 
market. 59 
Inalienability rules ensure specific outcomes to protect 
what Calabresi and Melamed call a "moralism," by which they 
55. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1119. 
56. Id. 
57. The liability rule ensures the efficient result regardless of initial alloca· 
tion because if a competitor values the entitlement more than the initial holder, 
she may purchase it even over the holder's dissent. Where uncertainty hampers 
the initial allocation, the authors suggest that the law could assign the entitle· 
ment based on the ex ante costs of each side in determining its implied harms or 
benefits. Id. at 1107-10. 
58. Id. at 1120. 
59. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (ac· 
knowledging that market price "does not necessarily compensate for all values an 
owner may derive from his property"); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985) ("The central 
difficulty of the market value formula for explicit compensation ... is that it de-
nies any compensation for real but subjective values."); Heller & Hills, supra note 
13, at 1474 (critiquing the eminent domain liability rule for necessarily under-
compensating reluctant private owners). 
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mean a strong policymaking consensus preferring some desired 
outcome despite the resulting efficiency and autonomy losses 
that the assignment of an inalienability rule inevitably im-
plies.60 In this way, inalienability may be used to serve a poli-
cy of paternalism (to protect legal actors under some kind of 
disability, such as minors with regard to statutory rape), or to 
achieve a preferred distributional preference in light of some 
compelling public policy (such as affirmative action).61 For ex-
ample, the implied warranty of habitability reflects a societal 
consensus about minimum levels of residential safety, despite 
its frustration of bargains that some landlords and tenants 
might otherwise reach for less expensive, less safe housing. 
From the standpoint of Law and Economics, the problem 
with inalienability rules is that they prioritize other policy con-
cerns over economic efficiency (if, as is often the case, these 
subjective concerns cannot be assigned a reliably measurable 
economic value).62 That said, inalienability rules are not al-
ways used in opposition to efficiency; Calabresi and Melamed 
note that they are occasionally appropriate to avoid the waste-
ful costs of setting up a market to shift an entitlement for 
which there is no actual demand.63 Still, they are most often 
deployed where the pursuit of efficiency takes a backseat to a 
countervailing policy concern. From the libertarian standpoint, 
the problem with inalienability rules is that they prioritize oth-
er policy concerns over individual autonomy. If there is not 
perfect consensus about the public policy privileged by the in-
alienability rule, then those who disagree with the policy may 
acutely object to this loss of all transactional control over the 
entitlement. 
B. The Cathedral in the Public Law Context 
The Cathedral framework originates in the private law 
context, but it is also meaningful in describing constitutional 
entitlements-as well as the infrastructural problems that can 
60. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1111-12, 1123-24. 
61. Id. at 1113-14. 
62. Some authors describe them as "public goods" that are hard to valuate 
economically. See, e.g., David S. Brookshire & Don L. Coursey, Measuring the 
Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77 
AM. ECON. REV. 554, 554 (1987) (considering the "practical problems" associated 
with measuring the value of public goods); Sameer H. Doshi, Making the Sale on 
Contingent Valuation, 21 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 296 (2008). 
63. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1123-24. 
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arise when courts must jurisprudentially infer what remedy 
rule should attach to an otherwise clearly stated normative 
rule. Some constitutional entitlements, such as individual 
rights, are easily analogized to the standard private law en-
titlements to do or have something. Other constitutional en-
titlements allocate jurisdictional authority to different govern-
mental actors, and assign limits to that authority. Although 
these more structural entitlements stray farther from the orig-
inal Cathedral inquiry, the framework remains surprisingly 
powerful in clarifying what happens when they are challenged, 
and offers useful analytical tools for courts that must deter-
mine remedies jurisprudentially. 
The scholarly consensus is that most constitutional en-
titlements are protected under a property rule, 64 although Pro-
fessor Eugene Kontorovich has recently demonstrated many 
instances of hidden liability rules.65 Still, all three varieties 
can be found in constitutional law, some specified in the text 
and others jurisprudentially. For example, a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial is treated as protected by a 
property rule, since she can bargain it away in exchange for a 
64. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 115, 239 n.112 (1997) (arguing that constitutional 
rights should not be transformed into "takings-clause-like 'liability' rights" be-
cause it would allow the government to "cynically treat violations of sacred consti-
tutional rights merely as the cost of doing business"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1, 93-94 (1988) (arguing that constitutional rights are properly protected 
with property rules rather than liability rules because "dignitary relationships 
between citizen and government" cannot be monetized and attempts to do so 
would, from the expressive perspective, devalue important political rights); Kon-
torovich, supra note 12, at 1138 (applying the framework to constitutional en-
titlements and remedies in general and suggesting that the dominant trend is to 
view constitutional entitlements as requiring property rule protection); David Lu-
ban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 
19 n.36, 19-20 (1999) (suggesting that the "only conceivable notion of constitu-
tional rights" entails "prophylactic protection from potential infringements" and 
that the Warren Court subscribed to such a property rule view of constitutional 
rights); Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1135 n.325 (2001) (observing that constitutional rights are 
presumptively protected by property rules); cf. Erik G. Luna, The Models of Crim-
inal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 436 (1999) (arguing that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine should seek to prevent unconstitutional conduct rather than 
compensate it, and that the government should not be able to " 'purchase' suppo-
sedly inalienable constitutional rights through the expediency of a liability rule"). 
65. Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1138 (suggesting that although the domi-
nant trend is to view constitutional entitlements as requiring property rule pro-
tection, the use of liability rules is widespread); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability 
Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
755, 758 (2004). 
20 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
plea agreement that she would rather have. Although land is 
generally protected under a property rule in the private mar-
ket, an owner's Fifth Amendment right against government 
appropriation for public use is protected under an explicit lia-
bility rule, since the state may take it over her dissent so long 
as just compensation is paid.66 Meanwhile, the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibition of slavery confers an entitlement to 
freedom zealously guarded by an inalienability rule, since even 
a consensual agreement to sell oneself into slavery will be le-
gally unenforceable.67 Voting rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment are also protected under an inalienability 
rule (and even more explicitly so by state law), since an enfran-
chised citizen cannot legally trade her right to vote to someone 
else.68 
Applying the Cathedral framework to constitutional en-
titlements generates some controversy: some suggest that it is 
heretical to speak of remedies for constitutional violations at 
all, because it implies that unconstitutional acts are permissi-
66. Professor Eugene Kontorovich has also coined the "pliability rule" combi-
nation of property and liability rules in certain areas of constitutional law, includ-
ing takings, since the liability rule for public-use takings is paired with a property 
rule for non-public-use takings. See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1161. An even 
more explicit pliability rule can be found in the Third Amendment proscription on 
quartering troops on private property during peace time without the owner's per-
mission-an explicit constitutional property rule that is less conspicuously paired 
with an implied liability rule protecting the entitlement during wartime. Id. at 
1140. 
67. Professor Thomas Merrill has proposed a variation on the Cathedral 
framework to better describe entitlements in the public law context, in which he 
suggests an alternate basis for inalienability rules. Merrill, supra note 12, at 
1143-44 (applying the framework to constitutional rights within the context of the 
government's efforts to reduce smoking). In his view, an inalienability rule is use-
ful whenever the value of keeping the entitlement where it is initially allocated is 
worth more to the public than it is to the holder of the initial allocation, thus pre-
venting socially undesirable transfers of publicly valuable allocations. See id. at 
1154. Merrill's suggestion is a useful way of understanding the Cathedral "moral-
ism" in the public law context, but it ultimately breaks down to the same way of 
understanding Calabresi and Melamed's "moralism" this Article uses: a policy-
making consensus about a desired outcome that outweighs the resulting efficiency 
and autonomy losses implied by the inalienability rule. 
68. See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1709 
(1999) ("The law treats voting as a 'market-inalienable' activity: Votes can be giv-
en away (indeed, they get most of their meaning from being 'cast'), but they can-
not be sold, at least not directly."); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 111, 116 (2000) ("It is possible to think of voting as unique but it is also 
defensible to think of voting rights as contained in a class of things generally held 
inalienable."). 
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ble so long as they are remedied appropriately.69 However, us-
ing the framework to better understand our most foundational 
legal rules does not undermine constitutional limits, it merely 
characterizes more accurately the inherent limits built into the 
underlying constitutional entitlements. In other words, speak-
ing of the liability rule protecting private property against con-
demnation for public use does not cheapen the Fifth Amend-
ment right to private property, it just accurately characterizes 
the remedy rule effectively built in to the constitutional grant. 
Either way, as Professor Kontorovich has argued, the distinc-
tion is ultimately about whether the essential negotiation over 
shifting an entitlement happens ex ante (as it does under a 
property rule) or ex post (as it does under a liability rule)-or 
not at all (as it does not under an inalienability rule)JO 
C. Federalism at the Cathedral 
The Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence 
shows the same array of choices among remedy rules for pro-
tecting assigned entitlements. Like other constitutional en-
titlements, most created by the rules of constitutional federal-
ism are protected under a property rule. For example, a state's 
Eleventh Amendment entitlement to sovereign immunity from 
citizen suit71 is protected by a property rule, because the state 
can choose to waive the entitlement by consenting to an other-
wise barred suit_72 In the New Federalism era, the Supreme 
Court has defended its strong protection of a state's rights 
under the Eleventh Amendment by characterizing the entitle-
ment to sovereign immunity as a core attribute of statehood-
one that cannot be casually abrogated without posing dire 
consequences for the success of the state as an enterprise of 
government_73 However, in keeping with its general approach 
69. E.g., Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1138 ("Limiting remedies to ex post 
money damages (thereby adopting a liability rule) is widely thought of as incom· 
patible with constitutional values."). 
70. See id. at 1137. 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
72. Jackson, supra note 64, at 89; see also Seamon, supra note 64, at 1135. 
73. E.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The Court noted: 
"[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much 
for what it says, but for the presupposition[s] ... which it confirms." ... 
[F]irst, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and 
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of protecting entitlements under a property rule, the Court has 
also consistently held that the Constitution does not prohibit a 
state from trading away this entitlement of its own accordJ4 
Similarly, the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction under 
the Commerce Clause and other federally enumerated powers 
is also protected by a property rule, as demonstrated by the 
Court's concomitant Spending Clause jurisprudence. Although 
the Commerce Clause grants a zone of positive jurisdictional 
authority to the federal government, 75 the entitlement can also 
be understood as a reciprocal entitlement to the states for fed-
eral regulatory noninterference beyond the designated limits 
(and it is this aspect of the Commerce Clause rule that has 
most interested the Court since the New Federalism revival)J6 
However, the federal government frequently uses its spending 
power to negotiate with the states for expanded regulatory ju-
risdiction beyond the limits of the commerce power or its other 
enumerated powersJ7 When this happens, a state is essential-
ly bargaining away its constitutional entitlement to federal 
noninterference in the relevant regulatory zone,78 much as an 
second, that " '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be ame-
nable to the suit of an individual without its consent.'" 
Id. (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961))). 
74. E.g., In reNew York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (repeating the constitution-
al proscription of citizen suits against a state unless "consent [is] given"). A state 
may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity if it does so explicitly. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) ("[W]e will find waiver only where stated 'by the 
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as 
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' " (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909))). 
75. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes .... "). 
76. In several of its most famous New Federalism decisions, the Court em-
phasized the limits of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Solid Waste 
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (invalidating fed-
eral Clean Water Act jurisdiction over isolated intrastate wetlands); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating federal civil remedies 
under the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
77. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding Con-
gress's use of the spending power to persuade states to enact a minimum drinking 
age). 
78. For example, even as the Court held that Congress lacked constitutional 
authority to require the states to take the challenged actions, it noted that Con-
gress remained free to persuade the states to do so using its power under the 
Spending Clause. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992). 
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individual defendant might trade away her property-rule-
protected Sixth Amendment entitlement to a jury trial in a plea 
agreement with the prosecution. For example, the federal gov-
ernment was able to persuade most states to reduce their speed 
limits during the gas crisis of the 1970s by conditioning their 
receipt of federal highway funds on the adoption of a fifty-five 
mile per hour maximum on interstate highways_79 
In the background of these reciprocal federal and state en-
titlements lurks the Tenth Amendment, promising a system of 
dual sovereignty in which the state and federal governments 
play distinct roles.SO It is the penumbral effect of the Tenth 
Amendment that creates the reciprocal state entitlement 
whenever the Constitution grants a limited power to the feder-
al government, such as the federal power to regulate interstate 
commerce. The state receives a reciprocal entitlement for fed-
eral noninterference beyond the limits thereby implied, such as 
the Court has found with regard to the regulation of domestic 
violenceS! or hydrologically isolated wetlands.82 Indeed, al-
though the New Federalism revival promotes a casual under-
standing of the Tenth Amendment entitlement as one against 
federal commandeering of state power,83 the better characteri-
79. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Rep. Speier Proposes National Speed Limit to Aid 
Fuel Efficiency, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing the 1974 law that 
conditioned federal highway funds on states' adoption of a fifty-five mph limit). A 
contentious modern example is President Bush's "No Child Left Behind" initia-
tive, by which the U.S. Department of Education has effectively mandated na-
tional elementary school performance standards, for example, David Nash, Note, 
Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and Equity in Partnership 
with the States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 253 (2002), even though public educa-
tion is beyond Congress's enumerated powers. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (noting that 
the commerce power does not authorize Congress to mandate a national school 
curriculum). 
80. Ryan, supra note 2, at 519, 564 (discussing the Tenth Amendment's dual 
sovereignty directive); see supra notes 31-32. 
81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (invalidating federal civil remedies under the 
Violence Against Women Act because the provision exceeded federal authority 
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
82. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 
(2001) (implying that the Army Corps of Engineers had exceeded federal authority 
under the Commerce Clause in asserting Clean Water Act jurisdiction over iso-
lated wetlands, but holding on statutory grounds to avoid reaching the constitu-
tional issue). See also infra note 235 (detailing how the progenies of this decision 
have spun the law of wetlands regulation into unworkable chaos). 
83. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (observing that the 
Tenth Amendment forbids the federal government to "issue directives requiring 
the States to address particular problems [or] command the States' officers, or 
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program"). 
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zation-acknowledged even by the Court's own New Federal-
ism proponents-is that the Tenth Amendment creates these 
very state and federal entitlements to reciprocal jurisdictional 
zones. To this point, writing for the majority in New York v. 
United States, 84 Justice O'Connor explained: 
In a case like these, involving the division of authority be-
tween federal and state governments, the two inquiries are 
mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Con-
gress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly 
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a 
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitu-
tion has not conferred on Congress. 85 
As noted above, in its commerce and spending-power juri-
sprudence, the Court has interpreted these reciprocal state en-
titlements as protected under a property rule enabling their 
waiver in spending-power deals. In its Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court has allowed the states to trade on an 
entitlement to sovereign immunity that it has described as an 
essential attribute of state sovereignty.86 But in the seminal 
case of its New Federalism Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Court chose a very different alternative from among those 
described in the Cathedral framework. In New York v. United 
States, as detailed in Part II, the Court protected its vision of 
mutually exclusive state and federal regulatory spheres under 
an inalienability rule that prevents any kind of waiver, even as 
it allows a parallel sort of waiver in spending-power cases.87 
84. 505 u.s. 144, 156 (1992). 
85. Id. See also Ryan, supra note 2, at 554-55. 
86. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) 
("A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that 
a State may consent to suit against it in federal court."); supra note 73. 
87. For the argument that the Supreme Court's spending-power cases wrong· 
ly undermine the rest of its New Federalism jurisprudence, see Lynn A. Baker, 
Federalism and the Spending Power from Dole to Birmingham Board of Educa· 
tion, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 205, 205-06 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (dis· 
cussing how South Dakota v. Dole provides a loophole through which Congress 
may continue to regulate the states beyond what is condoned in other areas of the 
New Federalism jurisprudence); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting 
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a 
Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499-500 (2003); 
llya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Re· 
striction of Federal Subsidies to State Government, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 461 (2002). 
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D. Skepticism and the Cathedral 
Before advancing to the case, however, it is worth confront-
ing potential skepticism about whether Calabresi and Me-
lamed's private law bargaining analysis is truly applicable in 
the remote context of constitutional federalism. This Article 
proceeds in the firm belief that there is much to be gained from 
intradisciplinary exchange between one area of legal thought 
and another-even when there are rough edges to the enter-
prise-because it can illuminate old problems with the clarity 
of a new vantage point, and unpack seemingly daunting new 
problems with the benefit of proven conceptual tools. Even so, 
are the differences between private and state-federal bargain-
ing so raw that the Cathedral framework simply cannot be 
made to fit? Analysis suggests otherwise. In fact, the dynam-
ics of state-federal bargaining approximate marketplace bar-
gaining even more closely than other forms of negotiation in 
which government is a party. Moreover, the uncertainties that 
pervade intergovernmental bargaining indicate that it suffers 
even more acutely from the very private law bargaining prob-
lems that Calabresi and Melamed urge are best resolved by the 
use of property and liability rules.88 
Political bargaining, involving the authoritative allocation 
of scarce resources, is often distinguished from economic bar-
gaining, which involves the price-regulated allocation of scarce 
resources.89 Political bargaining becomes necessary where 
high transaction costs prevent market efficient bargaining, 
leading to the use of sovereign authority. Similar problems re-
lating to collective action and "signaling" (by which parties 
communicate leverage, proposals, and concessions) occur in 
88. For good primers on bargaining theory in general and as applied to gov-
ernments, see generally GIDEON DORON & lTAI SENED, POLITICAL BARGAINING: 
THEORY, PRACTICE, & PROCESS (2001); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 
(1979); David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regu-
latory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599 
(2000). See also Benjamin L. Snowden, Note, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncer-
tainty: Understanding the Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 134 (2005) (detailing the rise and fall of the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact between Alabama, Georgia, and Flori-
da, and the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact between Alabama 
and Georgia). Snowden traces the seven-year history of the compacts from sign-
ing to breakdown, using the lens of bargaining theory to explore the legal and po-
litical issues that complicate negotiations engaging multiple sovereigns. Id. 
89. DORON & SENED, supra note 88, at 7. 
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both private and political bargaining, except that they are ex-
acerbated in political bargaining, which generally involves a 
greater variety of interests and players.90 Signaling becomes 
more complex-even baroque-in the context of political bar-
gaining.91 Compared with private parties, government actors 
encounter more difficulty identifying the full scope of their own 
interests at stake in the bargaining, because their constituents' 
interests often conflict.92 They may even encounter greater dif-
ficulty understanding the interests of the other parties to the 
negotiation, due to the public participation and open meeting 
requirements that often accompany governmental negotiat-
ing.93 The stress added to political bargaining by these factors 
only exacerbates the usual collective-action bargaining hurdles 
that motivated the original Cathedral analysis. 
State-federal political bargaining may be even more like 
private economic bargaining than the more conventional politi-
cal bargaining between participants in the same pool of sove-
reign authority. Where sovereign authority is truly divided (as 
between federal and state government), rather than nested (as 
between state and municipal governments), intergovernmental 
negotiation will be more like price-regulated private bargain-
ing, because neither side can compel the other to perform 
against its wilL94 The likeness becomes less clear in contexts 
where one side commands most of the negotiating leverage (if, 
for example, the regulatory target implicates clearly enume-
rated federal power and state authority has been all but field 
preempted), but the analogy is strongest in the gray area of in-
terjurisdictional concern that is the subject of this inquiry, 
where sovereign authority is divided and yet both kinds are ne-
cessary to effectively regulate. Even where power disparities 
90. See Snowden, supra note 88, at 179-80. 
91. Id. 
92. See, e.g., id. at 176-77. 
93. For example, in Snowden's account, initial meetings to discuss the pro· 
posed compacts included "as many as 50 to 150 stakeholder groups or representa-
tives," reducing negotiation to "statement[s] of positions" rather than the more 
nuanced information exchange preferred by bargaining theory. Id. at 179-80 (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview by Jo-
shua Azriel with Bob Kerr, Dir., Pollution Prevention Assistance Div., Ga. Dep't of 
Natural Res. (June 1999), available at http://www.wuftfm.org/rivers/ikerr.html). 
94. This is true, at the very least, in a properly functioning market for bar-
gaining. Where one side holds constitutional authority to regulate the other, as 
Congress may require state compliance with legislation enacted under the post-
Civil War amendments, then the relationship is not one of bargaining but of legi-
timate constitutional compulsion. 
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exist between the parties (and, to be sure, the federal govern-
ment is not always the more powerful party),95 this reflects the 
inherent inequalities of bargaining power that pervade private 
bargaining. For example, Professor Roderick Hill has argued 
that states behave "exactly like private firms" in negotiating 
federal-state partnerships under the spending power.96 
As do all negotiations, state-federal bargaining takes place 
"in the shadow of the law,"97 but uncertainty regarding that 
special legal context poses the biggest obstacle to efficient bar-
gaining. The primary source of uncertainty, especially in the 
interjurisdictional gray area, is the substantive question of who 
actually holds which jurisdictional entitlement.98 But infra-
structural uncertainties also pervade the law of intergovern-
mental bargaining-for instance, and especially in the federal-
ism context, whether or not a given entitlement is even a 
legitimate medium of exchange (as the anti-commandeering 
entitlement currently is not). Similarly, parties negotiate with 
an eye toward their best alternative to the negotiated agree-
ment,99 but uncertainty about the reach of judicial or congres-
sional intervention after the negotiation concludes can under-
mine the parties' efforts to understand their true alternatives, 
further compromising bargaining efficiency.IOO 
To facilitate more efficient intergovernmental bargaining, 
then, the single most important ex ante adjustment would be to 
reduce the legal uncertainties that attend it through the articu-
lation of clearer bargaining rules. Some uncertainty will al-
ways pervade political bargaining, due to the practical difficul-
95. As in all negotiations, leverage accrues to the party who loses the least 
from reaching no deal. The federal government would likely be the bigger loser 
were the states to withdraw from many cooperative federalism enterprises, as it 
would then have to find ways to provide the needed regulatory services entirely on 
its own, without the substantial assets of local government infrastructure. Cf 
Hills, supra note 29, at 817 (asserting that the "federal government should pur-
chase [state and local] services through a voluntary intergovernmental agree-
ment"). 
96. Id. at 870 (but also arguing that the anti-commandeering rule provides an 
important constraint on spending-power bargaining). 
97. Cf. Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 88, at 950. 
98. For example, in Snowden's River Basin Compact example, uncertainty 
regarding the extent of federal claims on the basin ultimately undermined the 
success of the entire negotiation. Snowden, supra note 88, at 184. 
99. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 100 (1991). 
I 00. For example, Snowden shows how uncertainties regarding the potential 
for congressional apportionment and the unlikely prospect of judicial intervention 
helped undermine the River Basin Compact negotiations. Snowden, supra note 
88, at 188. 
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ties associated with public accountability and open meetings, 
multiple stakeholders and conflicting constituent interests, and 
some level of interjurisdictional competition. Yet even if the 
substantive aspect of political bargaining remains confusing, 
this Article contends that the Court could improve the overall 
state-federal bargaining enterprise by clarifying the infrastruc-
ture-the procedural rules that help parties understand the 
available media of exchange and their best alternatives to 
agreement. New York u. United States arguably does this by 
articulating an inalienability rule that forbids one form of bar-
gaining altogether. However, Calabresi and Melamed argue 
that bargaining-related uncertainties-especially uncertainty 
about whether the initial allocation of entitlements was cor-
rect-counsels against inalienability rules.101 As proposed in 
Part III, and in contrast to the New York rule, enabling freely 
consensual bargaining over the anti-commandeering entitle-
ment would facilitate interjurisdictional progress in exactly the 
troubling case of uncertainty about the initial jurisdictional al-
location. But first, we explore the history, architecture, and 
consequences of the New York rule itself. 
II. INALIENABILITY AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT: THE NEW 
YORK RULE 
In 1992, New York u. United States inaugurated the Su-
preme Court's New Federalism era, setting forth the Tenth 
Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine in a decision that 
invalidated parts of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Act Amendments of 1985.102 The most forceful component of 
the Act's penalty structure was held unconstitutional for com-
mandeering state legislative authority, even though the states 
had collaboratively crafted the law and lobbied Congress for its 
passage over a competing proposal that would have preempted 
them entirely by shifting oversight to federal regulators.103 
The history of the New York saga foreshadows the difficulties 
101. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1120. 
102. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j 
(2006)). 
103. E.g., Neil Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Pers-
pective, 59 VA.."'D. L. REV. 1629, 1660-64 (2006) (arguing that in thwarting the 
state-based solution, the Court's decision in New York was ultimately more de-
structive to state sovereignty interests than would have been a decision to uphold 
the take-title provision). 
2010] FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL 29 
that the inalienability of the New York rule has since perpe-
tuated. This Part reviews that history, analyzes the inaliena-
bility rule created by the Court's decision, and describes the 
chaotic aftermath that has again prompted congressional at-
tention to the problem of safe and equitable disposal of radioac-
tive waste. Finally, it explores the special challenges that 
Tenth Amendment inalienability creates for intergovernmental 
responses to problems that implicate both state and federal 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and the New 
York decision involved a constitutional crisis over the disposal 
of radioactive waste. 104 As the Supreme Court explained, 
commercially and scientifically produced radioactive waste is 
both dangerous and ubiquitous: 
Radioactive material is present in luminous watch dials, 
smoke alarms, measurement devices, medical fluids, re-
search materials, and the protective gear and construction 
materials used by workers at nuclear power plants. Low 
level radioactive waste is generated by the Government, by 
hospitals, by research institutions, and by various indus-
tries. The waste must be isolated from humans for long pe-
riods of time, often for hundreds of years. Millions of cubic 
feet of low level radioactive waste must be disposed of each 
year.105 
104. Generated from medical, scientific, and commercial applications, these 
low-level radioactive waste products include debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid, 
metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity, and sealed radiologi-
cal sources that are no longer useful. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-
07-221, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: APPROACHES USED BY 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S. 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07 
22l.pdf. High-level radioactive waste, such as spent nuclear reactor fuel or wea-
pons-grade material, is dealt with separately, though just as controversially, as it 
is slated for burial beneath Yucca Mountain in Nevada. See Chris Rizo, NRC Re-
jects Nevada AG's Yucca Mountain Complaint, LEGAL NEWSLINE, Aug. 22, 2008, 
http://www .legalnewsline.com/news/2151 02-nrc-rejects-nevada -ags-yucca-
mountain-complaint (noting that 70 percent of Nevadans oppose the Yucca Moun-
tain project, and describing efforts to fight it). 
105. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-50 (1992). 
30 UNNERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Most Americans, it appears, prefer not to live near radioac-
tive waste disposal facilities, 106 and so the increasing use of 
commercial technologies involving radioactive materials over 
the 1970s and 1980s was not matched by an increase in dispos-
al facilities to deal with their waste products. By 1979, after 
half the nation's disposal sites had either filled up or closed for 
water management problems, only three low-level radioactive 
waste facilities remained in the United States to handle the en-
tire nation's waste: the Beatty site in Nevada, the Hanford site 
in Washington, and the Barnwell site in South Carolina.I07 
Nationwide, all waste that could not be stored safely at its site 
of generation was trucked to one of these three facilities, fru-
strating the citizens of Nevada, Washington, and South Caroli-
na, who resented bearing the burden of risk for the entire na-
tion's low-level radioactive waste stream. lOS 
The states with disposal facilities (the "sited states") faced 
a dilemma. They could not simply close their borders to inter-
state shipments of waste and continue to site in-state produced 
waste without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
which forbids the states from discriminating against interstate 
commerce.I09 For constitutional purposes, shipments by pay-
ing customers for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
created in other states represent a stream of interstate com-
merce otherwise indistinguishable from the preferred in-state 
shipments. Accordingly, the sited states had two options: they 
106. Id. at 182 (''Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal 
sites, but few want sites near their homes."). 
107. Id. at 150. 
108. Audeen W. Fentiman, Tamara L. Leyerle & Ronald J. Veley, Factsheet: 
Legislation Governing Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Ohio State Uni-
versity RER-60, http://ohioline.osu.edu/rer-fact/rer_60.html (last visited Aug. 29, 
2009) ("In 1979 the governors of Nevada and Washington believed that they 
should not have to bear forever the burden of low-level radioactive waste disposal 
for the entire country .... "). 
109. For example, the state of Washington tried to close its borders to out-of· 
state shipments of nuclear waste in 1981, but failed when a federal court deter-
mined that to do so would violate the dormant commerce clause and the Suprema-
cy Clause. Associated Press, State's Nuclear Waste Ban Is Ruled Unconstitution-
al, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1981, at 6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full 
page.html?res=9503E6D91138F934A15755COA967948260 (quoting Judge McNi-
chols's statement that the proposed ban was "unenforceable because it violates 
both the supremacy and the commerce clause"); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex 
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 (1945) (explaining the rationale behind the 
dormant commerce clause); Eby-Brown Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., 295 F.3d 749, 
756 (7th Cir. 2002) (''The so-called 'dormant commerce clause' prohibits the vari-
ous states from discriminating against or burdening items in the interstate 
stream of commerce."). 
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could trigger a constitutional standoff to make their point (but 
likely lose in court), or they could simply close their facilities 
down completely, forcing the rest of the nation out of its collec-
tive stupor and into action regarding the radioactive waste ca-
pacity crisis. 
One by one, they chose the latter option. In 1979, the Gov-
ernor of Nevada closed the Beatty site after a leak was found in 
a shipment of radioactive sludge delivered by truck; he pledged 
not to allow it to reopen until he could be assured that the 
packaging and transportation systems were "foolproof."IIO 
Shortly thereafter, Washington temporarily closed the Hanford 
facility, leaving South Carolina's Barnwell site as the only 
available disposal facility in the country. 111 This prompted 
South Carolina's own threat of closure, and the prospect of no 
disposal capacity finally jump-started a national political con-
versation to resolve the inequities faced by the sited states 
while protecting the public from unsafe exposure to harmful 
radioactive waste products.112 
To accomplish these objectives, Congress considered man-
dating a national regulatory program that would preempt state 
decision making.ll3 However, the states negotiated an alterna-
tive proposal through the National Governors Association and 
lobbied hard for Congress to adopt what came to be known as 
the "state-based" solution.114 Underscored by the general poli-
cy that each state should be responsible for its own waste, ll5 
110. See Nevada A-Dump Closed, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., July 13, 
1979, at 519. Mter reopening and closing several times, Nevada closed the site 
permanently in 1992. See Richard R. Zuercher, Nevada Accord Closes Beatty 
LL W Facility Permanently, NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 11, 1993, at 6; see also Squeeze 
on Wastes, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 12, 1978, at 21 (demonstrating the tense relations 
between Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina over site closures). 
Ill. New York, 505 U.S. at 150. 
112. See id. at 151; see also Thomas O'Toole, President Seeking Permanent 
Sites to Store Atomic Waste, Spent Fuel, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1980, at A1 (dis-
cussing the various sites that the federal government considered purchasing for 
waste disposal as the South Carolina facility became harder to use). 
113. New York, 505 U.S. at 192 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
114. !d.; see also id. at 189-90 (''To read the Court's version of events, one 
would think that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation's 
low-level radioactive waste problem. Not so. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act of 1980 ("1980 Act"), and its amendatory 1985 Act, resulted from the 
efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste prob-
lem. They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention, but rather congres-
sional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached." (citations omitted)). 
115. See id. at 190-91 ("In May 1980, the State Planning Council on Radioac-
tive Waste Management submitted the following unanimous recommendation to 
President Carter: 'The national policy of the United States on low-level radioac-
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the states' regional approach embodied a compromise between 
the sited states (frustrated at bearing more than their fair 
share of the nation's toxic waste) and the unsited states (des-
perate for more time to prepare for the point at which they 
would no longer be able to use the sited states' facilities).ll6 
Under this approach, states would be responsible for disposing 
of their own waste, either alone or within regional interstate 
compacts formed for the purpose of low-level radioactive waste 
disposal. 11 7 Each compact would choose a state to host the 
compact's disposal facility for a designated period, or otherwise 
provide for waste disposal, as by contractual arrangement with 
another compact for use of their facility. 11 8 Mter a reasonable 
period in which unsited states could build new disposal facili-
ties, the sited states would be authorized in 1986 to close their 
borders to interstate shipments of waste if they chose, or to 
admit waste generated only from within their own regional 
compacts. 119 
The plan would alleviate the unfair burden on the sited 
states while protecting all Americans from the hazards asso-
ciated with the cross-country transportation of low-level ra-
dioactive waste on public highways. However, the states could 
not implement the plan completely on their own; they needed 
Congress's formal blessing to head off the dormant Commerce 
Clause problem otherwise created by the controls on interstate 
waste shipments after the 1986 deadline.l20 In acknowledg-
ment of the states' hard-fought consensus, Congress unanim-
ously adopted the state-based approach in the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 ("the Act").121 
tive waste shall be that every State is responsible for the disposal of the low-level 
radioactive waste generated by nondefense related activities within its boundaries 
and that States are authorized to enter into interstate compacts, as necessary, for 
the purpose of carrying out this responsibility.' This recommendation was 
adopted by the National Governors' Association a few months later." (citations 
omitted))-
116. !d. at 181 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Act embodies a bargain among the 
sited and unsited States ... .''). 
117. !d. at 150-51. 
118. !d. at 151-52; Fentiman, Leyerle & Veley, supra note 108. 
119. New York, 505 U.S. at 151. 
120. !d. (''The 1980 Act authorized States to enter into regional compacts that, 
once ratified by Congress, would have the authority beginning in 1986 to restrict 
the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated within member States."). 
121. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 
(1980) (current version at 42 U.S. C.§§ 2021b-2021d (2006)). 
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Despite such national consensus before its passage into 
law, the plan was plagued by widespread noncompliance.l22 
The initial Act was toothless; 123 Congress had honored the 
states' request that it include no federal penalties for violations 
in the first few years, giving the states time to evaluate how 
best to perfect their plans without federal interference.124 
However, this deference did not serve the Act's goal of rapid 
progress toward the creation of additional disposal capacity, as 
no new facilities had been built even by 1985.125 As the sited 
and unsited states had negotiated, the Act permitted the sited 
states to refuse out-of-state shipments beginning in 1986, a 
fast-approaching deadline that was now certain to leave many 
states without any means of disposing of this hazardous 
waste.l26 The looming crisis was reminiscent of that which had 
prompted Congress to act in the first place: things seemed as 
they had in 1979 when the sited states first threatened to close 
their facilities, except that now they could do so without violat-
ing the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Anxious to forestall a top-down federal solution, the states 
returned to the negotiating table to hammer out a new propos-
al, which the National Governors Association persuaded Con-
gress to pass as the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
Amendments of 1985.127 The new compromise extended the 
122. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151. 
123. Id. ("The 1980 Act included no penalties for States that failed to partici-
pate in this plan."). 
124. Id. at 191-92 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White quoted 
from the Governors' Task Force's recommendation to Congress that it: 
defer consideration of sanctions to compel the establishment of new dis-
posal sites until at least two years after the enactment of compact con-
sent legislation. States are already confronting the diminishing capacity 
of present sites and an unequivocal political warning from those states' 
Governors. If at the end of the two-year period states have not respond-
ed effectively, or if problems still exist, stronger federal action may be 
necessary. But until that time, Congress should confine its role to re-
moving obstacles and allow the states a reasonable chance to solve the 
problem themselves. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 195 ("Congress could have 
pre-empted the field by directly regulating the disposal of this waste pursuant to 
its powers under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but instead it unanimous-
ly assented to the States' request for congressional ratification of agreements to 
which they had acceded."). 
125. Id. at 151 (majority opinion). 
126. See supra notes l19-20. 
127. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j 
(2006)); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 151 (acknowledging the role of the Nation-
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deadline by which unsited states could continue to ship waste 
to sited states until 1992, but included harsher penalties for 
non-compliance with a timetable of regulatory milestones re-
quiring states to take specific steps toward the ultimate goal of 
disposal self-sufficiency .128 
Noncompliant states would still lose access to the sited 
states' disposal facilities after the six-year extension, but states 
that failed to meet milestones over the intervening years could 
also be forced to pay steep surcharges for access to existing dis-
posal facilities in increasing increments over time, and denied 
certain access even before the 1992 final deadline.129 One 
quarter of the surcharges levied by the sited state facilities 
would be collected and redistributed by the Secretary of Energy 
to states that did meet the required milestones.130 
Finally, the most severe penalty under the new plan, and 
that most expected to motivate compliance, was the "take-title" 
penalty, by which a state that had not met the terms of the Act 
by 1996 would be held to "take title" to any low-level radioac-
tive waste produced within its borders at the request of the 
waste's producers. 131 The take-title provision essentially 
meant that a state would assume legal liability for any damage 
associated with low-level radioactive waste produced within its 
borders for which it had not made disposal arrangements, ei-
ther by building its own facility or by gaining access to a site 
with sufficient capacity through membership in a willing re-
gional compact. As a quid pro quo for the six-year reprieve that 
the sited states were granting, the unsited states were thus 
promising to make genuine progress toward self-sufficiency or 
face real and dire consequences. 
al Governors Association in preparing the terms of the law). Hereafter, references 
to "the Act" refer to the Low·Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act as amended in 
1985. 
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 151-53. Among these milestones: by 1986, each 
state was to have ratified legislation in which it either joined a regional compact 
or indicated an intent to develop a disposal facility within the state; by 1988, each 
unsited compact was to have identified the state in which its facility would be lo-
cated, and each compact or stand-alone state was to have developed a siting plan 
for the new facility; by 1990, each state or compact was to have filed a complete 
application for a license to operate the disposal facility (or certified that the state 
would be able to dispose of all in-state generated waste after 1992). Id. at 152-53. 
129. !d. 
130. !d. at 152. 
131. Jd.at153-54. 
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B. New York State's Challenge 
These Amendments might have achieved the needed ratio 
of carrot to stick, but the Tenth Amendment challenge that 
would follow obviated any such accomplishment. 
Over the following seven years, Congress approved nine 
regional compacts encompassing forty-two states, three of 
which included the sited states of South Carolina, Washington, 
and Nevada. 132 The six unsited compacts and four of the unaf-
filiated states met the first few milestones required under the 
Amended Act, among them New York State-one of the largest 
state producers of low-level radioactive waste in the nation.133 
Anxious for prolonged access to existing facilities until it could 
make other arrangements, New York had supported both the 
state-based plan that the National Governors Association in-
itially brought to Congress and the secondary compromise in 
the penalty-bearing Amendments, actively lobbying for their 
passage into federallaw. 134 With so much in-state waste pro-
duction, New York especially benefited from the additional 
twelve years of access under the law, and it made good faith ef-
forts to build its own facility during that time. 135 Although it 
enacted legislation providing for the siting and financing of a 
facility and identified five potential locations in Allegany and 
Cortland counties, the surrounding communities each stre-
nuously objected to the construction of a radioactive waste dis-
posal site in their vicinity.136 
With the 1992 deadline fast approaching and no contin-
gency for disposing of the waste that could soon be refused by 
the sited states, New York and its two counties sued to over-
turn the Act on various grounds, including violation of their 
rights under the due process clause, the Tenth Amendment, 
the Eleventh Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.137 Mter 
losing at the district and appellate court levels, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear New York on its Tenth 
Amendment and Guaranty Clause issues.138 The Court was in-
terested in New York's claim that the Act's penalty structure 
commandeered its retained reservoir of state sovereign author-
132. Id. at 154. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 180-81. 
135. Id. at 154. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
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ity, most dramatically through the take-title provision.139 New 
York argued that under the Tenth Amendment, Congress could 
neither force a state to build a radioactive waste disposal facili-
ty, nor compel it to assume liability for the waste of in-state 
producers, and so the false choice required under the Act ren-
dered it an unenforceable act of federal coercion.140 
The sited states intervened as defendants in New York's 
suit. 141 They agreed with the position of the United States that 
the Act did not violate the Tenth Amendment, but added that 
whether or not some other state could successfully object to the 
Act on these grounds, New York-of all states--could hardly 
state a Tenth Amendment claim of coercion when it had so 
clearly consented to the very terms it now challenged.142 Even 
if, arguendo, the Act really interfered with a state's Tenth 
Amendment rights in the abstract, they argued, New York had 
waived the relevant entitlement, not only through its participa-
tion in the National Governors Association process but by its 
independent efforts to get the Act and Amendment passed into 
federallaw.143 As Justice White wrote in dissent: 
139. Id. at 174-77. 
140. See id. at 175-76. 
141. Id. at 154. 
142. Id. at 180-81. As Justice O'Connor wrote: 
The sited state respondents focus their attention on the process by 
which the Act was formulated. They correctly observe that public offi-
cials representing the State of New York lent their support to the Act's 
enactment. A Deputy Commissioner of the State's Energy Office testi-
fied in favor of the Act. Senator Moynihan of New York spoke in support 
of the Act on the floor of the Senate. Respondents note that the Act em-
bodies a bargain among the sited and unsited States, a compromise to 
which New York was a willing participant and from which New York has 
reaped much benefit. Respondents then pose what appears at first to be 
a troubling question: How can a federal statute be found an unconstitu-
tional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to 
the statute's enactment? 
Id. (citations omitted). 
143. Id. Justice White wrote separately to convey his understanding of New 
York's waiver: 
In my view, New York's actions subsequent to enactment of the 1980 
and 1985 Acts fairly indicate its approval of the interstate agreement 
process embodied in those laws within the meaning of Art. 1, §10, cl. 3, of 
the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement of Compact with another 
State." First, the States-including New York-worked through their 
Governors to petition Congress for the 1980 and 1985 Acts .... Second, 
New York acted in compliance with the requisites of both statutes in key 
respects, thus signifying its assent to the agreement achieved among the 
States as codified in these laws. Mter enactment of the 1980 Act and 
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As I have attempted to demonstrate, these statutes are best 
understood as the products of collective state action, rather 
than as impositions placed on States by the Federal Gov-
ernment .... Indeed, in 1985, as the January 1, 1986, dead-
line crisis approached and Congress considered the 1985 
legislation that is the subject of this lawsuit, the Deputy 
Commissioner for Policy and Planning of the New York 
State Energy Office testified before Congress that "New 
York State supports the efforts of Mr. Udall and the mem-
bers of this Subcommittee to resolve the current impasse 
over Congressional consent to the proposed LLRW compacts 
and provide interim access for states and regions without 
sites. New York State has been participating with the Na-
tional Governors' Association and the other large states and 
compact commissions in an effort to further refine the rec-
ommended approach in HR 1083 and reach a consensus be-
tween all groups." 
Based on the assumption that "other states will [not] 
continue indefinitely to provide access to facilities adequate 
for the permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
generated in New York," the state legislature enacted a law 
providing for a waste disposal facility to be sited in the 
State .... [Justice White described New York's compliance 
with various provisions of the Act]. As it was undertaking 
these initial steps to honor the interstate compromise em-
bodied in the 1985 Act, New York continued to take full ad-
vantage of the import concession made by the sited States, 
by exporting its low-level radioactive waste for the full 7-
year extension period provided in the 1985 Act. By gaining 
these benefits and complying with certain of the Act's 1985 
deadlines, therefore, New York fairly evidenced its accep-
tance of the federal-state arrangement-including the take 
title provision. 144 
pursuant to its provision in § 4(a)(2), 94 Stat. 3348, New York entered 
into compact negotiations with several other northeastern States before 
withdrawing from them to "go it alone." 
Id. at 196 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
37 
144. Id. at 196-98 (citations omitted). Justice White further cited the rule in 
Dyer u. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), in which the Court denied a claim by West Vir-
ginia that it did not have the constitutional authority to enter into the compact it 
had already joined: 
Estoppel is not often to be invoked against a government. But West Vir-
ginia assumed a contractual obligation with equals by permission of 
another government that is sovereign in the field. Mter Congress and 
sister States had been induced to alter their positions and bind them-
selves to terms of a covenant, West Virginia should be estopped from re-
pudiating her act. 
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The sited states claimed that New York could not make out a 
commandeering challenge after specifically asking to be bound 
by the terms of a legislative bargain, one in which it had parti-
cipated just long enough to reap the intended benefits of twelve 
additional years of access to the sited states' facilities. Surely, 
they urged, New York's actions seeking federal ratification of 
the interstate deal it had helped negotiate should vitiate a later 
claim that Congress had violated its state sovereignty. 
To be sure, there were compelling arguments on both sides 
of the debate as to whether New York's actions leading up to 
the passage of the challenged provisions should have estopped 
its subsequent Tenth Amendment challenge. Its enthusiastic 
support for federal passage of the Act and its Amendments cer-
tainly made New York seem less like the victim of federal coer-
cion and more like an opportunistic litigant, one seeking any 
possible legal foothold before a Court itching to hold forth on 
matters of federalism. Similarly, waiver might be discernable 
from its manifested intent to abide by the terms of the Act until 
the time of its challenge-at least insofar as to take full advan-
tage of the period of extended access.145 
On the other hand, Tenth Amendment waiver had never 
previously been addressed by the Court, so whether New York's 
action did or did not constitute waiver would have been a ques-
tion of first impression. If Tenth Amendment waiver is compa-
rable to a state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit, then New York's actions-though suggestive and 
even self-serving-were still probably too indirect to have qual-
ified as waiver. Eleventh Amendment waiver must be made 
explicitly; there is no such thing as "implied" or "constructive" 
Eleventh Amendment waiver.146 By these standards, even if 
the National Governors Association could be held to have spo-
ken for New York, its recommendation to Congress did not 
have the force of a binding agreement by the states, it was not 
formally consented to by the state legislatures, and it certainly 
fell short of an explicit waiver of protected constitutional 
Id. at 199 (emphasis omitted) (citing Dyer, 341 U.S. at 34). 
145. Id. at 196-98. 
146. Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999) (explaining that its "stringent" test finds waiver of a 
state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity "if the State voluntarily invokes 
our jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to 
submit itself to our jurisdiction," but not if a state is merely consenting to suits in 
state courts or stating its intention to "sue and be sued" (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
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rights. Neither could statements of support for the legislation 
by higher-level New York officials be construed as express con-
sent to waive a constitutional right. That New York took ad-
vantage of open disposal facilities also may not manifest a clear 
intent to surrender its Tenth Amendment rights, at least if the 
appropriate metric were the Eleventh Amendment modeJ.I47 
In the end, the well-known outcome of the case is that New 
York prevailed on its Tenth Amendment claim with regard to 
the take-title penalty, the penalty was stricken, and legal his-
tory was made as the New Federalism's Tenth Amendment 
anti-commandeering doctrine was born.148 The Court was clear 
that although Congress could preempt state authority to direct-
ly regulate the interstate market for low-level radioactive 
waste disposal, and though it can wield the spending power to 
persuade states to voluntarily accede to a federal regulatory 
program, "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."149 In 
other words, the Tenth Amendment creates an entitlement to 
the states for a zone of federal noninterference, which, inter 
alia, forbids the federal government from using (or "comman-
deering") state government as an apparatus within a national 
regulatory program. 
C. The New York v. United States Inalienability Rule 
For the purposes of our inquiry here, however, the signifi-
cant part of the decision is not the anti-commandeering rule it-
self, but how the Court dealt with the question of waiver. In-
advertently or otherwise, it did so by protecting the new anti-
commandeering rule with a Cathedral inalienability rule. This 
section describes how the decision made the anti-
commandeering entitlement both explicitly inalienable by 
elected officials and implicitly inalienable by any other means, 
and differentiates the property rule that would apply to spend-
ing-power bargaining over related jurisdictional trades. 
1. Anti-commandeering Inalienability 
Rather than deciding, as well it might have, that New 
York's actions simply did not rise to the needed level for waiv-
147. See New York, 505 U.S. at 183. 
148. Id. at 187-88. 
149. Id. at 188. 
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ing the Tenth Amendment entitlement against federal com-
mandeering, the Court decided that the entire waiver question 
was moot. There was no need to decide whether New York's 
actions met the criteria for waiver because, simply put, there is 
no such waiver in the Tenth Amendment context. Writing for 
the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that a state may not 
waive its Tenth Amendment entitlement because the Tenth 
Amendment protects not the state itself but the interest its in-
dividual citizens hold in state sovereignty: 
The sited state respondents focus their attention on the 
process by which the Act was formulated. They correctly 
observe that public officials representing the State of New 
York lent their support to the Act's enactment .... Respon-
dents note that the Act embodies a bargain among the sited 
and unsited States, a compromise to which New York was a 
willing participant and from which New York has reaped 
much benefit. Respondents then pose what appears at first 
to be a troubling question: How can a federal statute be 
found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty 
when state officials consented to the statute's enactment? 
The answer follows from an understanding of the fun-
damental purpose served by our Government's federal 
structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereign-
ty of States for the benefit of the States or state govern-
ments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of 
the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, 
the Constitution divides authority between federal and 
state governments for the protection of individuals. State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism 
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffu-
sion of sovereign power." ... 
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the 
States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan 
cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. I 50 
By this reasoning, state actors can never waive the Tenth 
Amendment entitlement against federal commandeering. Even 
if the New York state legislature had explicitly signaled its in-
tent to waive any Tenth Amendment objections to the require-
ments of this or any other federal ~aw, said the Court, it would 
150. Id. at 180-82 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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have no legal consequence, because elected officials may not 
waive a constitutional entitlement intended to protect individ-
ual citizens. For the purposes of legislative and executive ac-
tion, then, the Tenth Amendment entitlement is inalienable as 
a matter of constitutional law. 
Moreover, decision (or game) theory indicates that it would 
be inalienable even by the citizens supposedly empowered by 
the Court's rationale except by legislative or executive action 
(or its functional equivalent). Whether a state's citizens could 
directly waive the entitlement was not addressed by the deci-
sion, but even if the majority had intended this odd contingen-
cy, any number of collective-action problems make the needed 
universal consensus both theoretically and pragmatically im-
possible.151 In reasoning that the entitlement cannot be 
waived by state officials because it exists to protect individual 
citizens, the Court essentially analogizes to others in the Bill of 
Rights that protect individuals and cannot be waived by elected 
representatives or majority vote, such as the right to jury trial 
or the right against unreasonable searches (which are, after all, 
countermajoritarian by design). But these other constitutional 
rights protect a waivable autonomy that can only inhere in 
separate individuals, while the Tenth Amendment protects 
something singular and external in which all citizens hold 
equal interests collectively .152 
For citizens to waive their collectively held Tenth Amend-
ment entitlement would thus require universal assent by each 
individually consenting citizen, but scholars of collective action 
agree that universal consensus in so large a group is all but 
impossible-not only due to inevitable policy dissensus among 
statewide electorates, 153 but also to the classic collective-action 
problem of holdout, where a minority wields its veto power to 
151. See generally MAN CUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971). 
152. Indeed, in District of Columbia u. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790-91 (2008) 
(invalidating a gun control ordinance banning handguns in the home), the Court 
clarified its understanding that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of sovereign 
authority to "the people" refers to them only in their corporate capacity, as the col-
lective body that forms the citizenry of a government: "the term unambiguously 
refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset." 
153. Even setting aside the holdout problem, members of a large group with 
common interest (such as a state) will almost never unanimously agree on the 
best way to further the group's interest. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 151, at 8 
(explaining this collective-action problem and noting the example of a labor union, 
where "the members ... have a common interest in higher wages, but at the same 
time each worker has a unique interest in his personal income"). 
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"hold out" for special treatment by a majority anxious for their 
agreement.154 A single naysayer could cancel the will of all 
other voters, creating overwhelming incentives for the ob-
stacles that game theory predicts in such environments (and 
for which liability rules are often used to defuse), 155 foreclosing 
the possibility that citizens could ever reach the universal 
agreement needed to alienate. 156 Similarly, the collective-
154. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1366-67 (discussing holdout in the real es-
tate context and observing that "[i]f a holdout is adamant, no private party can 
force him to sell the land in question at any price"). 
155. For example, the law of eminent domain employs a liability rule for exact-
ly this purpose. See, e.g., W.A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND POLITICS 68 (1995) ("Holdouts are endemic in public projects .... Preventing 
time-consuming strategic bargaining is an important justification for eminent 
domain."). 
Holdouts can also stall negotiations involving property sales, business 
mergers, and telecommunications. See, e.g., SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE 
BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED 
TRANSACTIONS§ 9:39 (2005) ("In NoDak Bancorporation u. Clarke, [998 F.2d 1416 
(8th Cir. 1993)], a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court de-
cision and held that the National Bank Act did not prohibit a 'freeze out' merger 
in which minority shareholders were forced to accept cash for their stock in a na-
tional bank."); see also NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422-23 ("Disallowing freeze out mer-
gers would mean that minority shareholders could hold up an efficient consolida-
tion or merger transaction by refusing to give their consent .... "); Dale Hatfield 
& Philip J. Weiser, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property 
Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 605 (2008) ("If all entrants in the telecom-
munications service or equipment manufacturing markets could be 'held up' from 
deploying a new service or product until the incumbent voluntarily agreed to af-
ford it access and interconnection to its network, those entrants would be placed 
at a formidable and likely insurmountable disadvantage."). 
Of note, the buyout of the tiny, polluted town of Cheshire, Ohio provides 
at least one documented example of a multiparty transaction that overcame the 
holdout obstacle. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayber-
ry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 91 
(2004). Still, with a population of only 221 people, the Cheshire example promises 
little for universal consensus at the state level, where populations range from 
Wyoming's 522,000 to California's 36,000,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and 
Puerto Rico: April!, 2000 to July 1, 2008, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/ 
NST-ann-est.html (select "Excel" under "Formats Available") (last visited Aug. 30, 
2009). 
156. The history of statewide referendums further demonstrate that they are 
unlikely to yield unanimity because voters are predictably unpredictable and of-
ten vote for reasons seemingly unrelated to the objectives of the proposition. Cf. 
JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 143 (2004) (discussing how even seemingly 
"crazy" proposals can attract surprising levels of support among statewide electo-
rates); Buck Wolf, Donald Duck's a Big Bird in Politics, ABC NEWS, http://abc 
news.go.com/Entertainment!WolfFiles/story?id=91051&page=l (last visited Aug. 
30, 2009) (noting that the Donald Duck Party has received enough write-in votes 
to be Sweden's ninth-most-popular political organization). There have been some 
unanimous or nearly unanimous group decisions in American history, but none on 
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action problem by which some individuals "free ride" on the 
contributions of others accounts, at least in part, for the chronic 
problem of low voter turnout at elections: most Americans ap-
preciate living in a democracy, but the large numbers who don't 
bother to vote on election day are effectively free-riding on the 
efforts of those who do. 
Even beyond the theoretical problems with achieving 
statewide consensus are the very real pragmatic problems im-
plied by the statewide referendum needed to accomplish it: 
would it really be possible to hold an election or census that 
would actually count the vote of each entitlement holder? The 
history of modern elections and census-taking suggests (strong-
ly) that the answer is no. Many presidential elections boast 
participation rates of barely half the electorate, and even 
among those who do show up, volumes of votes are cast but not 
counted for various reasons. 157 If an individual's entitlement is 
so precious that it cannot be waived by her elected representa-
tives, should we allow it to be waived by butterfly ballot?158 
Meanwhile, the federal government's acknowledgment that the 
the scale of a statewide referendum. See, e.g., Info USA, Bureau of Int'l Info. Pro· 
grams, U.S. Dep't of State, The Electoral Process, http://usinfo.org/enus/govern 
ment/elections/electoralProcess.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (noting that the 
Electoral College "voted unanimously on only two occasions, both for George 
Washington, for the terms beginning in 1789 and 1793"). 
157. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (citing statistics showing that 2 
percent of cast ballots fail to register a vote, either because the ballot remains 
blank, is insufficiently marked, or marks two different candidates); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION 
OF NOVEMBER 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002), http://www.cen 
sus.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf (reporting that only 55 percent of the total vot-
ing-age population voted in the unusually well-attended 2000 presidential election 
between candidates George W. Bush and Albert Gore). Indeed, not all citizens are 
registered or even entitled to vote (for example, children, felons in some states, 
and others that have not met various state requirements for voting), but the New 
York decision clearly associates the entitlement with citizenship, not voting sta-
tus. 
158. Cf. Don VanNatta Jr., Gore Set to Fight Palm Beach Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/25/politics/25 
PALM.html (noting that a basis for Gore's challenge was "10,000 sworn affidavits 
signed by residents ranging in age from 18 to 98, [many of whom] said they were 
confused by the butterfly ballot's design or were denied assistance or given wrong 
instructions"). Electronic malfunction represents another threat. See John 
Schwartz, Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, 
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/12/politics/12evote.html (re-
viewing the performance of electronic voting machines during the 2004 elections 
and noting that "[i]n a few states, including Florida, some voters reported that 
their selection of Senator John Kerry on touchscreens turned into a vote for Presi-
dent Bush, forcing them to restart the process so that their true votes could be 
properly recorded"). 
44 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO lAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
census regularly misses millions of Americans (and dispropor-
tionately among them, the poor and politically disenfranchised) 
led to a national debate about whether to supplement the 2000 
Census's raw enumeration with figures derived from statistical 
sampling techniques. 159 Referenda and census-taking are thus 
flawed means by which to ensure the participation of each of a 
state's citizens, but how else would citizens collectively waive 
their Tenth Amendment entitlement except by a vote or census 
of some kind? If the entitlement is substantial enough to war-
rant inalienability by elected officials, wouldn't the inevitable 
underinclusiveness of a statewide plebiscite also pose a consti-
tutional problem? 
Moreover, if we were to settle for something other than a 
perfect accounting of a universal consensus-for example, su-
permajority vote at a standard statewide referendum-then 
that would raise questions about why majority-elected state of-
ficials could not just alienate the entitlement as a proxy for the 
people's will in the first place. Indeed, the New York majority 
purported to protect citizens' Tenth Amendment interests by 
requiring state-federal cooperation to take place through condi-
tional federal spending or full federal preemption because these 
methods enable "the residents of the State [to] retain the ulti-
mate decision as to whether or not the State will comply,"160_ 
presumably by electing representatives who will enact their 
policy preferences. 
Yet this proposition is difficult to reconcile with its stated 
rationale for anti-commandeering inalienability. If electing 
representatives who reflect their policy preferences suffices to 
express citizens' will regarding their Tenth Amendment en-
titlement in spending-power contexts, why can't the same 
state-wide representatives act as rightful agents of their consti-
tuent entitlement-holders in bargaining with the federal gov-
159. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Barbara Vobejda, High Court Rejects Sampling 
In Census, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at A1 ("In hopes of getting more accurate 
population figures, the Census Bureau had wanted to combine the results of a 
traditional head count with a statistical 'sample' .... [This was done] to get a 
more accurate fix on the nation's population at a time when increasingly larger 
numbers of people do not speak English, are not part of stable families or move 
frequently."). 
160. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). Justice O'Connor 
explained: "If a State's citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local 
interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant .... Where Congress encourag-
es state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain respon-
sive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the 
people." Id. 
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ernment over the entitlement itself? How is one form of repre-
sentation meaningfully different from the other? Both seem to 
reflect the theory of representative democracy on which the re-
public is founded; it is not clear why the first way constitution-
ally protects citizens' Tenth Amendment interests and the 
second does not. 
Sliced theoretically or pragmatically, then, the Tenth 
Amendment entitlement described in New York was also ren-
dered inalienable. The Court did not employ the vocabulary of 
the Cathedral framework directly, so we cannot know what the 
majority truly intended regarding direct alienability by citizens 
(or more to the point, whether they thought it through at all). 
However, forensic analysis of the decision suggests that the 
majority intended a standard inalienability rule, binding 
elected officials and citizens alike. Importantly, the Court sup-
ported its conclusion by likening constitutional federalism to 
other structural constraints unavailable for renegotiation, like 
the horizontal separation of powers between the three branches 
of government. 161 This suggests the majority's view that Tenth 
Amendment state sovereign authority is an intrinsically in-
alienable constitutional medium-as fixed an entitlement as 
those protected by the non-delegation doctrine-regardless of 
whether by state or by citizen. 
2. Spending-Power Alienability 
But is this really so? Given the extent to which states reg-
ularly do waive such sovereign authority in spending-power 
negotiations with Congress and interstate compacts with other 
states, it is hard to understand how it could be without reject-
ing nearly a century of settled constitutionallaw.162 The Tenth 
Amendment is the core expression of constitutional federal-
ism-encapsulating the dual sovereignty directive that is its 
defining feature-but federalism constraints have a less im-
mutable quality than the horizontal separation of powers en-
161. Id. at 182 (''Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, 
therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 
'consent' of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the 
branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's divi-
sion of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the 
territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the en-
croachment."). 
162. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing state authority yielded to other states in 
interstate compacts). 
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titlements, l63 which have remained inalienable (at least in 
theory164) even as the Court has allowed federalism entitle-
ments to be traded on the open market in other contexts. 
States routinely waive their Eleventh Amendment entitlement 
to sovereign authority to private litigants, 165 their Tenth 
Amendment sovereign authority to other states in interstate 
compacts, 166 and their constitutionally protected jurisdictional 
territory to the federal government in the commonplace state-
federal bargaining via the spending power, 167 which even New 
York heralded as an available alternative to trading on the 
Tenth Amendment entitlement.168 How can all these other in-
stances of negotiated federalism constraints be permissible if 
they are supposed to be as fiercely protected as the separation 
of powers among the three branches?l69 
163. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (discuss-
ing the separation of powers doctrine and noting that it "depends largely upon 
common understanding of what activities are appropriate" to each branch). 
164. The Court has not enforced the non-delegation doctrine protecting the ho-
rizontal separation of powers for more than sixty years, instead upholding all re-
cent delegations to administrative agencies. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES§ 3.10.1 (3d ed. 2006); see, e.g., 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (holding that the 
EPA's promulgation of ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act was 
not a usurpation of legislative power). 
165. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 613 
(2002) ("This Court has established the general principle that a State's voluntary 
appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, and has often cited with approval the cases embodying that principle." 
(citations omitted)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681 n.3 (1999). 
166. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. Masters, The Interstate Com-
pact on Adult Offender Supervision: Using Old Tools to Solve New Problems, 9 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing how states use interstate com-
pacts to work together on national issues while preserving autonomy); see also in-
fra Part III.B.3 (refuting the distinction between the state sovereign authority 
yielded to other states in state compacts and to the federal government in state-
federal bargaining). 
167. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 87, at 205-06 (discussing how South Dakota v. 
Dole provides a loophole through which Congress may continue to regulate the 
states beyond what is condoned in other areas of the New Federalism jurispru-
dence); Baker & Berman, supra note 87, at 499-500 (arguing that the Court's de-
cision in Dole allows Congress to pursue goals under the Spending Clause that it 
otherwise could not); Siegel, supra note 103, at 1655-57 (arguing that the anti-
commandeering doctrine may not actually advance federalism values, since the 
Court's proposed alternative is that Congress engage states in spending-power 
deals that compromise the same federalism values claimed in support of the anti-
commandeering doctrine). 
168. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1992). 
169. One might counter that the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule 
protects federalism values of a different order than the Eleventh Amendment and 
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Enabling alienation of the same state sovereign authority 
in spending-power deals undermines the rationale for Tenth 
Amendment inalienability, and at least one federalism scholar 
suggests that the availability of state-federal bargaining under 
the Spending Clause converts the entire anti-commandeering 
infrastructure into a property-rule protected regime.J70 Profes-
sor Roderick Hills has identified the New York entitlement as 
protected under a property rule, correctly observing that it gets 
stronger protection than it would under a liability rule because 
the states may withhold their services from the federal gov-
ernment even if the federal government were to fully compen-
sate them.l71 However, his analysis considers only the two 
choices-property or liability rule-missing the third potential 
leg of the Cathedral stool. By contrast, Professor Ilya Somin 
invokes Calabresi and Melamed to more precisely specify that 
the anti-commandeering doctrine protects state autonomy ''by 
an 'inalienability rule' that prevents it from being violated even 
through the voluntary agreement of the states themselves."172 
Regardless of semantics, the Court's proposition that 
needed interjurisdictional collaboration can always take place 
through spending-power negotiations raises the fair question 
whether the entitlement is really alienable after all. If the 
same kind of state sovereign authority can be alienated by oth-
er means, then isn't it at least waivable in some form, and isn't 
that enough? The answers, respectively, are yes and no. The 
spending power enables one way in which states may waive so-
vereign authority, but the Cathedral framework appropriately 
directs our attention not just to the undifferentiated pool of so-
vereign authority, but to the relevant entitlement-the particu-
lar slice of that state sovereign bologna-that becomes the sub-
ject of bargaining. The argument that the spending power 
converts the New York inalienability rule into a property rule 
spending power do, but the underlying values of federalism do not change depend-
ing on which constitutional design feature is protecting them. See Ryan, supra 
note 2, at 602-06; Siegel, supra note 103, at 1660-68. 
170. Hills, supra note 29, at 822-23 (arguing that the New York entitlement to 
states to "withhold their own services and the services of state and local personnel 
subject to their constitutional authority from the federal government" is "pro-
tected by a property rule"). 
171. Id. 
172. Somin, supra note 87, at 482; see also McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, 
at 94 n.14 ("[W]e do not believe that state and federal officials should be able to 
bargain away or surrender their respective powers .... [T]he rules defining the 
structure of federalism are inalienability rules rather than property or liability 
rules."). 
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conflates the relevant entitlements, misses the important ways 
in which commandeering bargaining can resolve collective-
action problems that spending-power bargaining cannot, and 
presumes that the dance of state-federal negotiation should al-
ways be within the control of the federal government. 
The entitlement to a particular slice of sovereign authority 
waived in spending-power deals is infrastructurally distinct 
from the more specific anti-commandeering entitlement. First, 
the state's waived authority in spending-power deals may only 
be purchased for cash, not traded for in-kind regulatory bene-
fits as a waivable anti-commandeering entitlement might be. 
This precludes an infinite variety of intergovernmental bar-
gains that would trade waiver of a state's anti-commandeering 
entitlement to enable compensatory regulatory benefits-
benefits that could be justified in federalism terms and would 
be otherwise unrealizable.173 
In the New York example, the states collaborated to resolve 
an interjurisdictional regulatory problem in a way that pre-
served state autonomy against preemption but required federal 
ratification, which would have been a very difficult negotiation 
to effect under the spending power. Assuming arguendo that 
the New York defendants could prove waiver on their facts, the 
states would have had to replace the straightforward anti-
commandeering waiver they offered Congress (effectively, "We 
have come to an interstate agreement and need your help to 
make it enforceable by binding us to our promises") with an in-
vitation to a conditional spending bargain that might look more 
like: "We have come to an interstate agreement that needs your 
help to become enforceable, so please do that for us and also 
give us some money." Would those bargains really look the 
same to Congress? Perhaps Congress would prefer to just 
preempt the field, which might not benefit the state sovereign 
authority purportedly protected in this decision. 
In addition, spending-power deals do not afford the tools 
for negotiating around collective-action problems made availa-
ble through the negotiated waiver of states' anti-
commandeering entitlements. Again taking the New York facts 
to illustrate, the state-based solution was designed to resolve a 
demonstrated collective-action problem shown to require mea-
ningful enforcement measures to bind states to the bargain 
173. See Siegel, supra note 103 (describing how the anti-commandeering rule 
limits state autonomy in derogation of federalism values). 
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early on, when nobody yet knew who would benefit most or 
least. By forging a federally enforceable agreement behind the 
contract veil of ignorance, the states could create a meaningful 
regulatory system free of fair-weather bargaining partners, 
who might (as New York State ultimately did) free-ride on the 
continued sacrifice of the sited states and then renege when it 
becomes their turn to pay. 174 In a spending-power deal, states 
are free to join and leave the program as they see fit, simply by 
accepting and then refusing funds. Although this freedom may 
appear to advance the federalism value of local autonomy, that 
value is ultimately undermined by the wisdom of the contract 
law premise that we are most free when we can choose to be 
bound by our own promises.175 State compacts uncoupled from 
federal penalties suffer from the same defect because they are 
so easy to disavow. 176 After New York, no state can truly bind 
itself to its promises, and all the other states know it. 
Moreover, limiting state-federal bargaining to deals based 
on conditional spending confers a leadership role on the federal 
government at all times, again precluding the kind of novel 
bargaining the states sought to effect in New York. It assumes 
that Congress is the only party that would initiate intergo-
vernmental bargaining, empowers federal actors in the negoti-
ation by assigning them first-offer rights, and reduces the role 
of the states to accepting or rejecting the terms of a financial 
trade-off. Indeed, we should consider it significant that the 
spending power has not been the chosen medium for bargain-
ing in the intergovernmental negotiations that have encoun-
tered anti-commandeering challenges. What does that tell us 
about the limits of conditional spending negotiations? The very 
fact that the states and Congress all unanimously approved the 
approach undone in New York and did not simply turn to a 
spending-power arrangement thereafter suggests that there 
are differences in the spending-power approach that differen-
tiate the entitlements at issue, both substantively and for the 
practical purposes in which they have arisen in government. 
174. See infra Part III.B.3 (explaining why interstate compacts are hard to en-
force absent external penalties, because states can simply withdraw when they no 
longer wish to participate). 
175. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 9-11, 14-16 (1981). 
176. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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D. The Aftermath: Radioactive Waste Disposal in 
Interjurisdictional Limbo 
[Vol. 81 
Before exploring the legal implications of the Tenth 
Amendment inalienability rule, it is worth reviewing the prac-
tical consequences for low-level radioactive waste disposal that 
have followed. The ongoing gridlock is paradigmatic of that 
which paralyzes regulatory response to other problems similar-
ly stuck in New Federalism limbo, stranded in an unacknow-
ledged gray area between clearer realms of pure state and fed-
eral responsibility. 
Since the New York decision, complete regulatory stagna-
tion has exacerbated the problem of safe and equitable low-
level radioactive waste disposal. The states have made no net 
progress in creating additional disposal sites; there are still on-
ly three facilities for processing the entire nation's low-level ra-
dioactive waste.177 Not a single new facility has been built as 
part of the regional compacts created by the Act. Only one new 
facility has come on line since the permanent closure of the 
Beatty, Nevada site-a private facility in Clive, Utah.178 Be-
cause the Clive facility is licensed only to accept the least ha-
zardous class of radioactive waste, its addition does not alle-
viate the deficit in capacity exacerbated by the loss of the 
Beatty site.179 Furthermore, the Clive facility has generated 
additional controversy by contracting to accept low-level ra-
dioactive waste from Italy, which is projected to hasten the 
date by which it will fill to capacity (currently anticipated in 
about twenty years). 180 Utah and the other member states of 
the Northwest Compact have protested,181 but the private site 
177. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal 
Facilities, http://www.nrc.gov/wastelllw-disposal/locations.html Oast visited July 
14, 2008). 
178. See id. 
179. Clive's disposal facility is only licensed to accept "Class .A:' waste. U.S. 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET: ENERGYSOLUTIONS' PROPOSAL TO 
IMPORT LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM ITALY 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/fact-sheets/energysolutions.pdf. 
180. Bart Gordon & Jim Matheson, Op-Ed., Importing Nuclear Waste Is in 
EnergySolutions' Best Interests, but Not America's, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 5, 2008 
(noting that EnergySolutions' claim that it can handle all U.S. waste for the next 
19 years was based on unusually low estimates and did not include foreign ship-
ments). The Government Accountability Office reports that we do not even know 
how much waste we currently have, and that the "equation will also change" if 
more nuclear plants are licensed. ld. 
181. On May 8, 2008, the Northwest Compact states passed a resolution at-
tempting to block EnergySolutions' plans to accept imports of radioactive waste. 
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operator is fighting to preserve a likely lucrative contract, giv-
en that Europe faces an even gr~ater shortage of disposal op-
tions.182 Alarmed at the prospect of further eroding capacity 
for domestic waste, both houses of Congress have proposed bills 
to forbid domestic sites from accepting international shipments 
of radioactive waste.l83 
South Carolina's Barnwell site continued to accept the 
bulk of waste generated in the eastern United States until July 
1, 2008, when it finally acted on the authority conferred in the 
Act to close its doors to shipments of waste from outside its re-
gional compact. 184 Although the take-title penalty was over-
turned in New York, the Act's remaining penalty structure 
permitted the sited states to exclude after the deadline. South 
Carolina continued to provide access to the many members of 
the Southeast Compact (including, for a time, New York-
which had negotiated its way into the compact after its judicial 
victory because it still lacked disposal options for its in-state 
producers), but South Carolina eventually withdrew from the 
Southeast Compact when it became clear that its partner 
states were not progressing on their compact obligations to 
Charlotte E. Tucker, Dwindling Capacity in U.S. to Handle Low-Level Waste 
Prompts Import Questions, 31 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 495, 495 (2008). 
182. See, e.g., Warning on Nuclear Waste Disposal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hilscience/nature/4407 421.stm (discussing the severe 
shortage of radioactive waste disposal sites in England). To protect the contract, 
Clive's operator has filed suit in federal court to establish that the Northwest 
Compact lacks authority to interfere with the Italian contract because its facility 
is not contractually bound by the Northwest Compact. The suit sought a declara· 
tory judgment that the Clive site is a private commercial facility not established 
under the authority of the Northwest Compact, and therefore operates outside the 
Northwest Compact's power to approve or deny importation of waste. Tucker, su-
pra note 181, at 495. In February 2009, the judge ruled that the Clive site" 'is not 
now and has never has been a regional disposal facility' " and will soon decide 
whether "Congress intended to grant compacts the authority to regulate other fa-
cilities." Amy Joi O'Donoghue, EnergySolutions Wins Small Victory in Bid to 
Store Italy's N-waste, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.deseretnews.com/ 
article/1,5143, 705287580,00.html (quoting Judge Ted Stewart). 
183. In response to the Clive site's proposal, House Representatives Bart Gor-
don (D-TN), Jim Matheson (D-UT), and Ed Whitfield (R-KY) introduced a bill 
(H.R. 5642) that would "ban imports of low-level radioactive waste into the United 
States." Mike Ferullo, Radioactive Waste: Congressmen Offer Bill to Ban Import 
of Foreign-Generated Low-Level Waste, 39 ENVTL. REP. 562, 562 (2008). Senators 
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) introduced a similar bill 
in the Senate. See S. 3225, 110th Cong. (2008). 
184. South Carolina's Barnwell Closes; Many Without Rad Waste Disposal, 
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, July 7, 2008, at 1. 
52 UNIVERSITY OF COWRADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
share disposal responsibilities. 185 At one point, South Carolina 
became so incensed over unfair exploitation within the compact 
that it initiated a high-stakes constitutional standoff with 
North Carolina, from whom it formally ceased accepting waste 
shipments in 1995 after North Carolina repeatedly failed to ful-
fill its compact responsibility to site a new facility.186 The Gov-
ernor of North Carolina threatened to sue South Carolina un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause,I87 though he never 
delivered on the threat (perhaps reluctant to litigate with such 
patently unclean hands, or perhaps because the Clive site be-
gan accepting nationwide shipments around the same time).188 
South Carolina eventually joined the much smaller Atlantic 
Compact with New Jersey and Connecticut, and as of July 2008 
Barnwell will now accept interstate shipments only from these 
two states.189 
Barnwell's closure to the rest of the nation has finally trig-
gered the crisis that commanded the attention of Congress and 
the National Governors Association during the 1980s. As ana-
tion, we are arguably in an even worse situation than before 
the Act and Amendments were passed.190 There are still only 
185. See Andrew Meadows, Governor-Elect Wants South Carolina to Rejoin 
Nuclear- Waste Group, STATE, Dec. 15, 1998 (reporting on South Carolina's depar-
ture from the Southeast Compact). 
186. MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE 
DISPOSAL 17 (2006), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Sep/RL 
3346l.pdf. 
187. See Jim Clarke, N.C., S.C. at Odds Over Who Can Use Barnwell Landfill, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 26, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 1767874 (Wes-
tlaw NewsRoom). 
188. See Richard R. Zuercher, Envirocare Sets Sights on Market for Class A 
Commercial LLW, NUCLEONICS WEEK, July 20, 1995, at 1, 1. Nevertheless, four 
other states in the Southeast Compact sued North Carolina for some $90 million 
in light of its various failures to comply with the terms of the Compact. See Ala-
bama v. North Carolina, 539 U.S. 925 (2003) (granting leave to file complaint); 
540 U.S. 1014 (2003) (appointing a special master to handle the litigation). The 
case is presently ongoing. E-mail from John F. Maddrey, Assistant Solicitor Gen-
eral, N.C. Dep't of Justice, to author (Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author). 
189. See Barnwell Closure Results in Revised Storage Guidance, NUCLEAR 
NEWS, July 2008, at 19 (noting that its declining disposal capacity has forced 
Barnwell to discontinue its open-door policy and accept only from within the At-
lantic Compact). 
190. The one silver lining to this continued failure is that the increasing costs 
of low-level radioactive waste disposal has somewhat dampened supply, slowing 
the pace of the looming crisis, but also the pace of potentially life-saving medical 
research. See Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm'r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Re-
marks at the Electric Power Research Institute's 2007 International Low Level 
Waste Conference and Exhibit Show: The Need for Alternatives in Low Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Disposal (June 26, 2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/read 
ing-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/2007 /S-07 -033.html (acknowledging 
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three low-level radioactive waste facilities nationwide. Han-
ford accepts waste only from the Northwest and Rocky Moun-
tain Compacts, and Barnwell accepts only from the two other 
states in the Atlantic Compact. Only Clive will accept ship-
ments from any producer in the entire nation, but Clive accepts 
only the least hazardous "Class A" forms of waste, which de-
grade over a period of one hundred years.191 
Hoping to resolve that particular aspect of the capacity cri-
sis with the stroke of a pen, nuclear industry lobbyists have 
asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reconsider its 
waste classification system.192 The Commission is presently 
considering their proposal, which would allow holders of low-
level radioactive waste to blend the more hazardous Class B 
and C wastes (which can take up to five hundred years to de-
grade) with Class A waste, and classify the resulting product 
simply as Class A. 193 If adopted, the new system would enable 
the Clive site, approved only for Class A waste, to begin accept-
ing the more hazardous forms without taking additional safety 
precautions, prompting resounding protest from nearby Utah 
residents.194 In addition, Clive is poised to devote a portion of 
that the system is broken and noting the stress on medical research). In 2001, the 
National Academies commissioned a study finding that the cost of disposal was a 
major driver in the directions of medical research. See COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF 
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. POLICY ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN 
THE U.S., BD. ON RADIATION EFFECTS RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
IMPACT OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY ON 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at http:// 
www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10064 (follow "Download Free PDF' hyper· 
link). The report found that if disposal access were further restricted by addition-
al site closures, medical facilities already stressed to capacity might not be able to 
meet the need for additional long term on-site storage. Id. at 37-40. 
191. Patty Henetz, Huntsman Signs Waste-Ban Measure, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Feb. 26, 2005, at A6 (reporting that Utah permits only Class A waste, the "least 
radioactive but most abundant" form, having banned Class B and C wastes). 
192. Fahys, supra note 16 ("[l]n the industry's latest effort to reduce the 
amount of B&C waste that would require expensive storage until new disposal is 
found, it has asked the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reconsider its low-
level waste categories. If successful, nuclear plants and other waste generators 
will be able to mix B&C waste with untainted or mildly contaminated waste to 
meet Utah's Class A radioactivity limits-which means it can be buried in Ener-
gySolutions' Utah landfill."). 
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g., Editorial, Radioactive Cocktail: Blending Waste Won't Lessen the 
Danger, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 1, 2008 ("Officials from our nation's nuclear power 
industry have devised a magical mathematical formula that miraculously trans-
forms dangerous Class B and Class C nuclear waste into less-ominous Class A 
waste."). As the Tribune observed, "[t]he trouble is, the formula defies the asso-
ciative property of mathematics, the laws of science and the canons of common 
sense. The only way to make A + B + C = A is to remove B and C from the equa-
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its available capacity to importing waste from nations like Ita-
ly, further hastening its projected fill date. 
Accordingly, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner public-
ly acknowledged in 2007 that "the low-level waste compact 
process has not been quite as successful as we would have 
hoped."195 
While the NRC has developed national standards for low-
level radioactive waste disposal in its regulations the agency 
does not currently regulate any of the disposal sites in the 
United States. The current disposal facilities are all regu-
lated by states .... 
The Low [L]evel Radioactive Waste Policy Acts of 1980 
and 1985 were supposed to ensure a reliable and predicable 
means of disposing of low level radioactive waste. The acts 
made each state responsible for providing for waste dispos-
al, but I do not believe that the overarching objectives of the 
acts will ever be realized.196 
Indeed, the citizens of South Carolina, Washington, and Utah 
remain unhappily burdened with an unfair share of the entire 
nation's hazardous waste; all citizens remain at risk for waste 
transportation accidents over long stretches of public high-
ways; and the nation is that much closer to running out of 
available disposal capacity without further options. Rising oil 
prices have renewed national interest in nuclear power, but 
erecting more nuclear power plants-which produce significant 
quantities of both high-level and low-level radioactive waste-
would significantly exacerbate the problem.197 
The 1980s collaboration between the states and Congress 
used a variety of carrots and sticks to incentivize unsited states 
tion." Id. Even before the new blending proposal, Utahns were already concerned 
about attracting more radioactive waste to the state. Judy Fahys, Guv Says 'N-0' 
to N-Dump Times Two, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 11, 2005, at A1 ("Gov. Jon 
Huntsman Jr., bent on protecting Utah from becoming a national dumping 
ground for radioactive waste, announced Thursday he will reject plans to double 
the size of Envirocare of Utah, a landfill for government and reactor cleanup 
waste in Tooele County."). The Governor was reacting to reports that the facility 
had accepted 93 percent of government radioactive waste that went to all domes-
tic commercial facilities between 1998 and 2003. Id. 
195. Jaczko, supra note 190. 
196. !d. 
197. Although some waste can temporarily be stored on site, all must be 
processed at a proper disposal facility when the plant is eventually decommis-
sioned. See id. 
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to take responsibility for their fair share of risk, but New York 
dissolved the most persuasive stick, and carrots have proved 
insufficient. The states have lost any incentive to resolve the 
collective-action problem without a means of enforcing the 
needed interstate bargain. Congress, having been judicially 
disciplined on federalism grounds for an attempt made with 
due respect for state autonomy, has lost all incentive to impose 
a top-down solution that (even if legal) will engender serious 
federalism friction. Neither Congress nor the states have mea-
ningfully wrestled with the resulting regulatory "hot potato" 
since then, each side seeming to conclude from their loss in 
court that the status quo is really the other's problem.198 Yet 
solving the problem of equitable radioactive waste disposal has 
proved the exclusive province of neither one nor the other side 
alone; it is an interjurisdictional problem best tackled with the 
unique regulatory capacities that both Congress and the States 
bring to bear. 
E. Tenth Amendment Inalienability and the Gray Area 
Problems like this occupy an interjurisdictional gray area 
at the margins of clear state and federal prerogative, demand-
ing regulatory attention at both the local and national level. 
Sometimes, this is because neither side has all the legal juris-
diction needed to address the problem (for example, in dealing 
with water pollution, which passes from land uses regulated at 
the state level into water bodies regulated at the federal lev-
el).199 Sometimes, the federal government could but declines to 
preempt state involvement under its enumerated powers be-
cause the state needs regulatory capacity that the federal gov-
ernment can only acquire by replicating the state apparatus 
198. Ryan, supra note 2, at 588-90. Of note, Utah, Maine, and Vermont have 
each attempted to assert some authority over the production of low-level radioac-
tive waste within their borders, requiring new and relicensing nuclear facilities to 
obtain approval from governors, legislatures, and/or voters, though one commen-
tator has suggested that this legislation violates the Supremacy Clause. Melissa 
B. Orien, Battle over Control of Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Some States Are 
Overstepping Their Bounds, 2005 BYU L. REV. 155, 156 (2005) ("If a state enacts a 
statute that conflicts with federal goals for LLRW, then the statute is preempted 
by federal law."). 
199. Ryan, supra note 2, at 572-80 (describing such "de jure" interjurisdiction-
al regulatory problems); see also id. at 514, 570 (limiting the discussion of "regula-
tory problems" to the classic targets of administrative law, including "market fail-
ures, negative externalities, and other collective-action problems that individuals 
are ill-equipped to resolve on their own"). 
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that generates it (for example, the local expertise that facili-
tates counter-terrorism and disaster response efforts).200 Fed-
eral duplication of state government would not only be foolishly 
inefficient, it would threaten the very federalism values that 
motivate the Tenth Amendment in the first place. 
The three intervening decades since the Act was passed 
have demonstrated that coordinating safe and equitable ra-
dioactive waste disposal is among the more stubborn regulato-
ry problems that have become stranded in the interjurisdic-
tional gray area. The New York saga reveals it as a matter 
that concerns both the states and the federal government, and 
one whose resolution requires the unique capacity that each 
can offer. It is a textbook national collective-action problem re-
quiring a federal umpire, in that none of the states wants to 
site the hazardous facility that all of them nevertheless need, 
with each state hoping to "free-ride" on another's sacrifice.201 
Mter all, Congress became involved only after the states, act-
ing separately, were fast approaching one of two unacceptable 
outcomes (either South Carolina would remain the unwilling 
bearer of all other free-riding states' costs, or it would close its 
site altogether and leave the entire nation without safe dispos-
al options). At the same time, it is a textbook example of a lo-
cal land-use problem in which surrounding communities have 
profoundly unique interests. Siting a hazardous waste facility 
implicates the very governmental decision making about land-
use planning that is the hallmark province of state and local 
government-and for good reason, bearing as it does on issues 
of property law, public health and safety, community stability, 
and other equitable matters of uniquely local concern.202 Even 
200. Id. at 580-84 (describing such "de facto" interjurisdictional regulatory 
problems). 
201. That is, unless the states were to outlaw production of this kind of waste 
altogether, a proposal that no state has yet adopted. See generally U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM'N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL 
(2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rrnldoc-collections/nuregslbro 
chureslbr0216/r2/br0216r2. pdf. 
202. For example, several states require municipal or local voter approval of 
new or renewed licenses for low level radioactive waste facilities, consistent with 
the traditional role of local government in approving land uses that would affect 
neighboring homes and businesses. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1493 
(2001) (requiring state-wide voter approval of LLRW sites); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
19-3-105{3) (2007) (requiring municipal approval of LLRW processing facilities); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7012{f) (2006) (requiring local voter approval of LLRW 
sites). The hurdles created by these statutes indicate the tension between the pa-
rochialism that can accompany local land-use authority and the need for a nation-
ally-mediated program to create disposal capacity for unavoidable radioactive 
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the Court conceded that the problem occupies an interjurisdic-
tional zone, in its recognition that both the states and federal 
government are empowered to regulate there.203 As with many 
such interjurisdictional regulatory problems, a partnership ap-
proach is appropriate, desirable, and possibly the only effective 
means of proceeding. Why, then, is such collaboration so diffi-
cult to realize? 
At least part of the problem is that through such banner 
New Federalism decisions as New York, the Supreme Court 
has endorsed an idealized model of dual sovereignty that fails 
to account for the messy reality of interjurisdictional regulatory 
problems, and inadvertently frustrates the negotiation of cer-
tain state-federal partnerships needed to resolve them. Al-
though the New Federalism's model posits mutually exclusive 
spheres of clearly identified state and federal jurisdiction, per-
sistent problems like equitable low-level radioactive waste dis-
posal call attention to an interjurisdictional gray area between 
them, where the spheres partly overlap.204 For regulatory 
problems in the gray area, efficient resolution requires partici-
pation by both the state and federal governments-either for 
the unique jurisdictional authority each holds (for example, in 
regulating water pollution, which triggers federal authority 
under the Commerce Clause but also local authority in regulat-
ing the land uses that cause most water pollution)205 or for the 
unique regulatory capacity that each side brings to the table 
(for example, in counterterrorism and disaster relief, in which 
the federal government does not preempt state involvement be-
cause localized capacity is critical to effective on-the-ground re-
connaissance and response).206 Effective coordination is often 
stunted by the New Federalism's bright line of strict jurisdic-
waste. Such statutes acknowledge the traditional role of local government in ap-
proving local land uses that affect neighboring homes and businesses, but they 
may exacerbate the not-in-my-backyard ("NIMBY'') phenomenon that has ob-
structed the development of new capacity needed to handle the nation's waste 
load. For this reason, a regulatory approach is needed that can both appropriate-
ly honor local interests while also refereeing the nationwide collective-action prob-
lem in which all communities would prefer to free-ride on another neighborhood's 
risk-taking. 
203. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution 
permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regard-
ing the disposal of low level radioactive waste."). 
204. Ryan, supra note 2, at 567-72 (defining the interjurisdictional gray area). 
205. ld. at 574-80 (describing the "de jure" interjurisdictional regulatory prob-
lem of water pollution). 
206. Id. at 580-84 (describing the "de facto" interjurisdictional regulatory prob-
lems of air pollution and counterterrorism efforts). 
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tional separation,207 as Congress's adoption of the state-based 
solution was later eviscerated by the inalienability rule articu-
lated in New York. 
The state-federal partnership approach taken in the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was not the only way to 
tackle this interjurisdictional regulatory problem,208 but it was 
a solid plan that drew unanimous support from Congress and 
each of the states.209 Although the most serious environmental 
justice questions were preserved for the ultimate siting deci-
sions,210 the state-based approach promised at least a rough 
environmental justice between the states, guaranteeing that 
the burden of environmental risk would be shared throughout 
the nation. By forcing all the states to internalize costs they 
had previously been happy to externalize to South Carolina, 
Nevada, and Washington, the Act would have realigned the in-
terests of voters and lawmakers nationwide toward better 
regulatory decision making about the production and use of 
materials that none wished to host later as waste. Local com-
munities would have more voice under the state-based solution 
than they would have under a fully federalized approach. The 
states were thus willing to accept the contained prescription of 
federal interference implied by the take-title penalty because 
they preferred it to the alternative, by which Congress might 
rely on its commerce authority to craft a federal solution that 
preempted state input from top to bottom.211 
207. Id. at 584-96 (critiquing the impacts of the dual federalism model on in-
terjurisdictional regulatory response). 
208. John Dinan, Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism 
Decisions, 32 PUBLIUS 1, 12 (2002) (arguing that Congress had viable options for 
coping with the problem even after New York because it could persuade state ac-
tion via its spending power or directly regulate waste producers under its com-
merce authority). 
209. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc., Supporting a State and Re-
gional Approach to a Complex Environmental Issue, http://www.llwforum.org (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter LLRW Forum] (noting that both the original 
1980 legislation and the 1985 amendments "were endorsed by the Governors of 
the 50 states"). 
210. Low-income and minority neighborhoods bear a disproportionate percen-
tage of the national burden of hosting hazardous waste facilities, which contribute 
to high rates of asthma and other health problems in host communities. E.g., An-
na Kuchment, Into the Wilds of Oakland, Calif: Young Pollution Sleuths and 
Community Activists Fight for Healthier Air, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2008, at 49, 50. 
211. No state voted against the state-based solution that was proposed at the 
1980 meeting of the National Governors' Association, and which the Association 
then took to Congress. See LLRW Forum, supra note 209. Had one of the states 
opposed the terms of the state-based solution during this process and later sued to 
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The ultimate question is whether the states should have 
been able to make this choice. In other words, even if the 
Tenth Amendment gives states the means to protest federal in-
terference when it would thwart the good governance values 
advanced by constitutional federalism, should they also be able 
to waive their entitlement when doing so would promote those 
values? Mter all, American federalism erects not only the 
checks and balances that curb both state and federal power, 
but also enables the potential for harnessing local and national 
expertise into regulatory partnerships to enable what neither 
the states nor the federal government could accomplish 
alone.2I2 
Coordinating an effective resolution to the national collec-
tive-action/local land-use problem of radioactive waste disposal 
is a single example of many in this variety, each stuck in the 
limbo of the interjurisdictional gray area so obscured by the 
New Federalism ideal. Many other interjurisdictional regula-
tory problems have also become the subject of negotiated state-
federal partnerships, and many others would benefit from the 
alternative. Indeed, although New York is the only case that 
explicitly states the inalienability rule, it is hardly the only one 
affected. 
For example, a decade of deliberations preceded the Phase 
II Stormwater Rule of the Clean Water Act, during which the 
states and federal government collaborated in the design of a 
national-local regulatory partnership ideally suited to the in-
terjurisdictional task of protecting the nation's waters from lo-
cal stormwater pollution.213 Protecting navigable waters is a 
matter of federal jurisdiction, but most land uses that are the 
source of stormwater pollution are under the jurisdiction of 
invalidate the Act, it would have presented an interesting twist on the waiver 
question that was not raised by the facts accompanying New York's suit. 
212. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 619 (noting that "it was the early States' recog-
nition that centralized coordination was necessary to realize efficient interstate 
commerce, provide for the common defense, and resolve interstate disputes that 
led to the rejection of the Articles of Confederation in favor of constitutional fede-
ralism"); see also id. at 655-58 (discussing how American federalism is designed 
to facilitate problem solving at the most local level with capacity, which may re· 
quire partnership approaches in the interjurisdictional gray area). 
213. See Brief of Respondent-Intervenor Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. at 50, Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 
2003) (Nos. 00-70014, 00-70734, 00-70822), 2001 WL 34092891 (listing partici-
pants of the Phase II Subcommittee); OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, STORM WATER DISCHARGES POTENTIALLY ADDRESSED BY PHASE II OF 
THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM STORM WATER 
PROGRAM 1-21 to -22 (1995). 
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state and local government.214 Recognizing this intersection, 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 
invited the states and their localities to participate in the crea-
tion of a regulatory program, which-like the state-based solu-
tion in New York-departed from the conditional spending and 
preemption models to empower municipalities directly in de-
signing localized pollution controls that satisfied EPA's base-
line requirements.215 
Nevertheless, EPA's oversight of local stormwater permit-
ting required under the Plan was challenged as a commandeer-
ing of state sovereign authority.216 The Ninth Circuit narrowly 
upheld the permitting program, but only by painstakingly es-
tablishing that municipalities could avoid the challenged over-
sight by invoking an alternative available under a separate 
section of the Clean Water Act.217 It took the panel two opi-
nions over three years to establish this, which it did over a vi-
gorous dissent.218 Without the inalienability rule, the court 
might have more simply concluded that the states had waived 
their Tenth Amendment entitlement in consenting to the colla-
boration they helped create (and better still, the states could 
have simply specified it as so). Although the Phase II Rule ul-
timately survived the Tenth Amendment challenge, the fact 
that this negotiated partnership was nearly undone by complex 
anti-commandeering litigation further chills other attempts at 
non-spending-power bargaining to cope with other interjuris-
dictional crises. 
Similar issues arise as legislators struggle to reconcile new 
federal climate initiatives with the various state laws passed 
while federal attention to the issue was unforthcoming. Over 
most of the past decade, states have led the charge to reduce 
214. Land-based activities that contribute to stormwater pollution, such as real 
estate development, impervious surfacing, and the use of fertilizers and pesticides 
in lawn care, are matters of state concern. E.g., City of Abilene v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 325 F.3d 657, 659-60 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing the permit process 
by which municipalities collaborate with the EPA to prevent stormwater pollution 
from reaching municipal sewer systems). See generally ENVTL. LAW INST., 
ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER 
POLLUTION (1998) (listing relevant state laws). 
215. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Stormwater Program, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npd 
es/home.cfm?program_id==6 (last visited Aug. 27, 2009). 
216. See City of Abilene, 325 F.3d at 659-60. 
217. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC l), 319 F.3d 398, 
415 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
218. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC II), 344 F.3d 
832, 845 (9th Cir. 2003) (confirming its original holding in EDC I upholding the 
regulatory partnership against the Tenth Amendment challenge). 
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Americans' greenhouse gas emissions,21 9 but even the archi-
tects of these programs urge that national leadership is needed 
for success.220 Many acknowledge the need for federally uni-
form standards and obligations for regulated parties that oper-
ate in more than one state, but others observe that the states 
are uniquely situated to regulate many causes of greenhouse 
gas production within their traditional police powers over 
health, safety, and land uses, and to tailor policies to regional 
differences.22l States that followed California's lead in regulat-
ing greenhouse gas emissions by automobiles (under a Clean 
Air Act provision that authorizes both the EPA and California 
to set standards and allows other states to choose between 
them) were confronted with unsettling (though ultimately un-
successful) lawsuits by the automobile industry arguing that 
California's standards are federally preempted.222 Congress 
219. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dernbach & Thomas D. Peter· 
son, Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States Matter, NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 3, 4 (describing eight northeastern states' Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, six western states' and two Canadian provinces' West-
ern Climate Initiative, and the Climate Registry, which includes thirty-nine 
states and two Canadian provinces). See generally The Climate Registry, 
http://www.theclimateregistry.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2009); RGGI, Inc., Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2009); 
Western Climate Initiative, http://www. westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2009). 
220. See, e.g., McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3 (''Most 
observers, even at the state level, see state and regional efforts as a next-best 
strategy in the absence of serious national leadership."). 
221. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. The scholarly literature is also brimming with discussion 
about the challenges posed by the uncertain impact of federalism doctrines for ef-
fective climate change regulation. See generally Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative Fede-
ralism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 
(2008); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Moti-
vating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does 
This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAw. 1015 (2006); 
Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate 
Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 791 (2008); David Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: 
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority (Ariz. Legal 
Studies, Discussion Paper No. 07-23, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1016767; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change (UCLA Sch. of 
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-09, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115556. 
222. See, e.g., Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224, 227-28 
(D.R.I. 2008) (affirming decisions in Vermont and California that neither the 
Clean Air Act nor the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which set miles-per-
gallon standards for motor vehicles, preempted state greenhouse gas emission 
standards); Marc Lifsher & John O'Dell, Automakers Challenge States' Emissions 
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has considered at least seven different comprehensive climate 
change bills that would have applied to all sectors of the econ-
omy,223 but each was criticized for failing to better collaborate 
with existing state programs and leverage state expertise and 
regulatory capacity, and none made it to the President's 
desk.224 There may be many reasons why Congress has not 
better engaged the states, but among them is the fear, stoked 
by the New York inalienability rule, that enlisting state agents 
as partners in a federal regulatory program may invite legal 
challenges-as the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
and Phase II Stormwater Rule did-even when the states are 
willing partners. 
Because New York rendered bargaining over commandeer-
ing illegal, Congress and the states have never again replicated 
the precise form of partnership there invalidated, and it is thus 
hard to know how frequently instances of such bargaining 
would arise otherwise. The Phase II Stormwater Rule comes 
closest, although that plan was carefully crafted with a (baro-
que) "opt-out" provision-inspired by New York, and made 
possible by the fact that its regulatory target did not hinge on 
the prevention of a collective-action problem requiring uniform 
participation (like radioactive waste disposal). Although we 
cannot now know precisely how often anti -commandeering bar-
gaining will prove useful, we do know how many problems lan-
guishing in the interjurisdictional gray area need new regula-
tory approaches, and we can surmise that many could benefit 
Laws, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C2 (describing the later-dismissed suit 
against Vermont's tailpipe standards for greenhouse gases, which were based on a 
California standard that had been adopted by ten other states). The new admini-
stration is taking a more aggressive approach to tailpipe emissions, and showing 
greater willingness to allow states to lead. Janet Raloff, California May Yet Get 
the First Greenhouse Gas Limits for Cars, SCIENCENEWS, Feb. 6, 2009, http:// 
www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/40664 (reporting that President Obama di-
rected the EPA to review the previous administration's refusal to let California 
set tough tailpipe-emissions standards for new cars and trucks). 
223. McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3-4; America's Cli-
mate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); Low Carbon Economy Act 
of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, llOth Cong. (2007); 
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, llOth Cong. (2007); Global Warm-
ing Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship and 
Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, llOth Cong. (2007). 
224. McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3-4; cf. Darren Sa-
muelsohn, Senate Leader Says Energy, Climate Bills Will Be Combined, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/03/05/05climatewire-sen 
ate-dems-to-put-energy-emissions-bills-in-10009.html (reporting on ongoing ef-
forts to regulate climate impacts). 
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from greater flexibility in how intergovernmental partnerships 
might be formed, especially those confronting collective-action 
hurdles.225 The New York inalienability rule removes a poten-
tially fruitful tool from a toolbox with few others, a toolbox to 
which state and federal regulators must increasingly turn to 
combat our most difficult regulatory problems. 
Scholars have increasingly recognized the challenge of 
managing interjurisdictional regulatory problems within the 
New Federalism paradigm, and many have questioned the use-
fulness of a theoretical model that so poorly tracks the real 
world it seeks to order.226 Some critics suggest that American 
federalism has outlived its relevance in general,227 while others 
advocate alternative federalism models that better reflect the 
complex reality of the regulatory landscape.228 For example, in 
225. Cf Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (suggesting that even outright commandeering 
can confer benefits for the role of states in a federal system). 
226. See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 108-09 (2005) (noting the ''benefits of regulatory overlap [and] 
cooperative federalism structures"); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regula-
tory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8-14 (2003) (ex-
amining how the "regulatory commons problem" can generate regulatory gaps for 
interjurisdictional problems like urban sprawl and global warming); Jody Free-
man, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
4-8 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance that involves 
cooperation between agencies and government in the administrative process); Ro-
bert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 
248-49 (2005) (proposing the concept of polyphonic federalism, where the focus is 
placed upon the interaction between state and federal authority, rather than upon 
where the two spheres diverge); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the 
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006) 
(arguing that the static allocation of regulatory authority to either state or federal 
government obstructs good environmental management, and that broadly over-
lapping state and federal jurisdiction is needed). 
227. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on aNa-
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908-14 (1994) (arguing that the original 
colonial benefits of federalism no longer apply in the modern United States). 
228. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 570, 653 (1996) (arguing for "multiple tiers of governmental activity 
in the environmental domain"); Hills, supra note 29, at 816-17, 938-44 (arguing 
for local autonomy on a functional basis, as opposed to the New Federalism's focus 
on principles of dual sovereignty and political accountability); Nolan, supra note 
37, at 18-20 (advancing a model of integrated federalism that relies on greater 
cooperation based on each governmental actor's capacity for problem solving in a 
given context); Schapiro, supra note 37, at 1466-68 (proposing a framework 
whereby federal and state courts participate together in developing constitutional 
law); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Fe-
deralism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 719-20 (2001) (concluding that a "reverse-Erie" 
doctrine is needed to balance federal supremacy and state autonomy in the ad· 
ministrative context); Kimberly C. Galligan, Note, ACORN v. Edwards: Did the 
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previous work, I have advocated for a model of "Balanced Fede-
ralism" that better accounts for the interjurisdictional gray 
area and mediates the inevitable tension between each of the 
various values that undergird American federalism, including 
not only the checks and balances privileged by the separation-
ist ideal of the New Federalism model but also the values of lo-
calism, accountability, and subsidiarity-tempered problem solv-
ing.229 Proposals like these keep us honest and thoughtful 
about the American experiment, but the adaptation required 
before any would yield fruit is unlikely to materialize quickly 
enough to provide meaningful gray-area solutions in the short 
run. 
Still, there is fruit hanging lower on the tree, even now, in 
easy reach of the Supreme Court even from within its chosen 
paradigm. The Court could easily enable progress in the gray 
area from within the New Federalism model, facilitating the 
negotiation of needed state-federal partnerships with minimal 
change to existing precedents. A slight adjustment could pre-
serve most of what the New Federalism revival has accom-
plished while encouraging the resolution of problems that have 
languished in the gray area since New York was decided. 
Without upsetting the substance of the Tenth Amendment 
anti-commandeering rule or any other important New Federal-
ism precedents, the Court could simply replace the jurispru-
dential inalienability rule with a property-rule remedy. 
Fifth Circuit Squirrel Away States' Tenth Amendment Rights at the Cost of Na-
tional Environmental Welfare?, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 508--09 (1998) (arguing 
for a middle-of-the-road approach to federal-state cooperation). 
229. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 644-665. To remedy the theoretical problems 
left unresolved by cooperative federalism and the pragmatic ones caused by New 
Federalism, I argue that the Court should adopt a model of Balanced Federalism 
that better mediates between competing federalism values and provides greater 
guidance for regulatory decision making in the interjurisdictional gray area. 
Where the New Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to police a stylized boun-
dary between state and federal authority from crossover by either side, Balanced 
Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to patrol regulatory activity within the 
gray area for impermissible compromises of fundamental federalism values. The 
article concludes by introducing the outlines of a jurisprudential standard for in-
terpreting Tenth Amendment claims within a model of Balanced Federalism dual 
sovereignty that affords both checks and balances. Id. 
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III. TOWARD BARGAINING IN THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY 
AREA: A PROPERTY RULE APPROACH 
65 
When the anti-commandeering rule made New York the 
most celebrated case of the New Federalism revival, the in-
alienability rule tucked in to protect it garnered far less atten-
tion. The Supreme Court has never revisited this aspect of the 
rule, and the relevant language in New York has never been 
cited in a subsequent case, favorably or otherwise. Nor has it 
attracted previous scholarly inquiry. But what the inalienabil-
ity rule lacks in charisma, it makes up for in potency: the 
states and Congress have never again attempted to replicate 
the partnership lawmaking model that produced the ill-fated 
Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. In the name of fede-
ralism, state-federal bargaining has been confined to the condi-
tional spending model, despite its foreclosure of state-
leadership opportunities and collective-action resolution. 
Of course, it could be that this model was so flawed that its 
short-lived influence is well deserved. On the other hand, the 
states and Congress have not since produced a meaningful al-
ternative for the safe and equitable disposal of radioactive 
waste in interstate commerce.230 The fact that-but for New 
York's self-serving challenge-the Act seemed poised to succeed 
where nothing else has raises the fair question whether pre-
venting the states from bargaining with their entitlement is 
truly a good idea. Neither the normative nor the remedial ele-
ment of the anti-commandeering rule is specified in the text of 
the Tenth Amendment itself, but even if we stipulate that the 
substance of the rule is constitutionally required, the remedial 
aspect is as open to interpretation as those attaching to the 
Sixth or Eleventh Amendments. In the absence of a clear tex-
tual directive or entrenched precedent on the matter (and the 
Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence over the last century 
can be called anything but entrenched231), the jurisprudential 
nature of the determination invites interpretive and policy con-
230. Of note, this Article deals only with the problem of low-level radioactive 
waste disposal, but the problem of how to safely and equitably dispose of high-
level radioactive waste (the most toxic byproducts of nuclear reactors and wea-
pons programs) is just as pressing. The current federal plan is to store such waste 
in a national deposit under Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which remains the subject 
of vociferous protest among Nevadans unhappy about bearing the entire nation's 
share of risk. E.g., Rizo, supra note 104. 
231. E.g., Ryan, supra note 2, at 539-49 (reviewing vacillations in the Court's 
twentieth century federalism jurisprudence). 
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siderations about whether the inalienability approach actually 
makes sense. 
If the purpose of the Tenth Amendment is to protect the 
fundamental federalism values, which remedial rule best ac-
complishes that? Even if protecting the anti-commandeering 
entitlement with an inalienability rule makes sense some of 
the time, does it make sense all of the time, as would justify 
the universal quash on this form of state-federal bargaining? 
Why not enable the kind of consensual bargaining that the 
state of New York apparently favored when it lobbied for feder-
al passage of the state-based approach? And if not in all cases, 
then at least those in the uncertain territory of the interjuris-
dictional gray area, where novel intergovernmental bargaining 
may be the key to resolving otherwise intractable problems? 
This Part proposes that the Court protect the anti-
commandeering entitlement with a property rule instead, re-
jecting the weak rationales that the Court offered in support of 
the inalienability approach. 
A. The Property Rule Approach 
Some barriers to interjurisdictional problem solving 
created by the New Federalism's line of strict jurisdictional 
separation could be surgically alleviated, simply by enabling 
bargaining around that line under a property rule. 
1. The Case for a Property Rule 
The property rule approach distinguishes itself from the 
others in the Cathedral framework by enabling the parties to 
shift entitlements through consensual bargaining. Liability 
rules allow competitors to shift the entitlement over the hold-
er's protest, and inalienability rules force the parties to live 
with the initial distribution even if both would prefer other-
wise. In the interjurisdictional gray area, the inalienability 
approach frustrates the problem-solving value of federalism, 
while a liability rule that would enable the usurpation of state 
sovereign authority would threaten the value of checks and 
balances. However, a property rule that enables the state to 
decide for itself would satisfy all federalism values. It would 
advance the problem-solving value by facilitating the negotia-
tion of regulatory partnerships needed to solve interjurisdic-
tional problems. It would advance the values associated with 
2010] FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL 67 
local autonomy by preserving decision-making authority to the 
states. And it would respect the check-and-balance value, pro-
tecting the fundamental order of American dual sovereignty, by 
reserving veto rights over waiver to the states. 
A property rule would also take advantage of a primary 
architectural feature of the existing New Federalism Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence. The New Federalism's otherwise 
controversial bright-line approach to jurisdictional separation 
heralds one potential advantage for state-federal bargaining: 
bright lines can help facilitate efficient bargaining where bar-
gaining is desirable, as it would be in the gray area. Ideally, 
bright lines delineate the relevant parameters of a bargaining 
environment232-who holds which entitlement, the available 
media of exchange, and each party's best alternative to reach-
ing agreement. The pro-bargaining potential in the New Fede-
ralism model reveals the great inefficient irony of the New York 
rule: The substantive anti-commandeering element of the rule 
enhances state autonomy by preventing federal coercion, draw-
ing a line in the sand between state and federal entitlements 
that could facilitate consensually negotiated partnerships 
around that line. Then the remedial element undermines state 
autonomy by preventing the very bargains facilitated by the 
bright-line substantive element. (Bad infrastructure indeed.) 
Moreover, the property rule would facilitate the efficient 
resolution of interjurisdictional uncertainty in important ways 
that the inalienability rule cannot. The inalienability approach 
exacerbates inherent problems with the line-drawing enter-
prise to begin with, as demonstrated by none other than Pro-
fessor Coase. The Coase Theorem teaches that bargaining pro-
tects against errors made in the initial assignment of legal 
entitlements under conditions of uncertainty,233 and-at least 
in the interjurisdictional gray area-uncertainty pervades the 
initial allocation of regulatory jurisdiction at the margins of the 
New Federalism's paradigm of mutual exclusivity. Indeed, 
when the regulatory target implicates both state and federal 
obligations, the assignment of the jurisdictional entitlement 
exclusively to either the state or the federal government proves 
232. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577, 577 (1988). 
233. Coase, supra note 38, at 15 ("It is always possible to modify by transac· 
tions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such 
market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take 
place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production."). 
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essentially arbitrary. As described above, the New Federal-
ism's strict protection of these arbitrary assignments has va-
riously led to regulatory uncertainty, gridlock, litigation, and 
abdication, such as that which has plagued not only the regula-
tion oflow-level radioactive waste, stormwater pollution,234 and 
wetlands,235 but even governmental response to threats of ter-
rorism and natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina.236 
By contrast, property-rule protection for Tenth Amend-
ment entitlements would enable states to engage in the very 
bargaining that Coase, Calabresi, and Melamed all predict will 
facilitate efficiency when uncertainty muddles the initial allo-
cation.237 Calabresi and Melamed explain that the law can 
help maximize efficiency by assigning entitlements to reflect 
Pareto optimality ("that allocation of resources which could not 
be improved in the sense that a further change would not so 
improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could 
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than 
before"),238 or that which yields the most overall societal value 
and fewest overall societal costs.239 However, when there is 
234. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text (describing challenges to 
the Phase II Stormwater Rule). 
235. In Rapanos u. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-32 (2006), a fractured Su-
preme Court rejected portions of the Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdictional 
guidelines regarding wetlands regulation without achieving consensus on how the 
Corps might establish permissible guidelines, throwing the field into further dis-
array. See also Jeff Kinney, Internal EPA Memo Finds Enforcement Decreased 
Following Rapanos Decision, 39 ENV'T REP. 1392 (2008) (reporting on a House 
oversight committee investigation of post-Rapanos Clean Water Act enforcement 
and an internal EPA memorandum stating that the Rapanos decision may be un-
dermining "EPA's ability to maintain an effective enforcement program"). 
236. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 567-95 (critiquing the impacts of the dual fede-
ralism model on regulatory response in each of these interjurisdictional scena-
rios); Dickey, supra note 3 (reporting on national security conflicts). 
237. See Coase, supra note 38, at 15; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 
1093-95 (noting Coase's argument that "economic efficiency will occur regardless 
of the initial entitlement" in the absence of transaction costs, which "must be un-
derstood extremely broadly as involving ... the absence of any impediments or 
costs of negotiating''). 
238. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1093-94 ("[E]conomic efficiency 
asks for that combination of entitlements to engage in risky activities and to be 
free from harm from risky activities which will most likely lead to the lowest sum 
of accident costs and of costs of avoiding accidents. It asks for that form of proper-
ty, private or communal, which leads to the highest product for the effort of pro-
ducing."). 
239. Although Calabresi and Melamed take economic efficiency as a primary 
consideration in the allocation of legal entitlements, they are clear that it is not 
the only basis on which the law should choose; additional considerations include 
the unique "other justice reasons" and distributional preferences of any given so-
ciety. Id. at 1098--1105. 
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uncertainty about which initial distribution would best maxi-
mize benefits and minimize costs, efficiency can only be rea-
lized by allowing entitlements to shift until a Pareto optimal 
allocation is reached.240 
Assigning regulatory jurisdiction to either the state or fed-
eral government in the interjurisdictional gray area is a project 
of uncertainty by definition, refereed by well-intended but falli-
ble human beings. To then defend these entitlements with an 
inalienability rule fixes errors in the arbitrary initial assign-
ment forever. The property rule would protect the division of 
state and federal power while empowering both to take the 
needed steps in negotiating the kinds of partnerships that can 
effectively cope with interjurisdictional quagmires. 
Key is the property rule's element of choice. In empower-
ing the entitlement holder to decide for itself whether or not to 
bargain, the property rule approach enhances state sovereignty 
by supporting local autonomy-a federalism value on par with 
checks and balances.24I A classic statement of Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is that states should not be "compelled" to 
participate in a federal regulatory program,242 and even more 
recent decisions emphasize the centrality of preventing federal 
"coercion" of the states.243 But where the states invite federal 
regulation-if only to make it possible to enforce their own 
agreements against corrosive collective-action problems-there 
is no coercion. The consensual element inherent in property 
rule protection means that states will not waive their Tenth 
Amendment state sovereignty unless they elect to do so--just 
240. Id. at 1093-97. When there is uncertainty about the initial distribution of 
entitlements, the authors suggest that it allocate costs to the party that can best 
perform the needed cost-benefit analysis (or most cheaply avoid costs), and if it is 
too difficult to determine the least cost avoider, then to the party that can most 
cheaply act in the market to correct disparities in the entitlement distribution 
(since they expect that our imperfect markets in fact will create transaction costs). 
Id. at 1096-97. 
241. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 610-20 (discussing the federalism values in 
protecting the benefits oflocalism). 
242. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 
288 (1981); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
243. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC If) 344 F.3d 
832, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the Tenth Amendment, "the Federal 
Government may not compel States to implement, by legislation or executive ac-
tion, federal regulatory programs," (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997)) and that "[t]he crucial pro-
scribed element is coercion; the residents of the State or municipality must retain 
'the ultimate decision' as to whether or not the State or municipality will comply 
with the federal regulatory program" (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 168)). 
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as they elect to waive sovereign authority when they enter into 
spending-power deals that expand federal authority beyond its 
initial jurisdictional entitlement.244 Even federalism theorists 
who worry that state officials will elect to collude with the fed-
eral government in undermining federalism constraints have 
conceded that the anti-commandeering context is least vulner-
able to their concern. As Professors John McGinnis and Ilya 
Somin have explained: 
In practice, commandeering is not nearly as great a danger 
to federalism as the Spending power and the Commerce 
power. State governments often have strong incentives to 
resist uncompensated commandeering because, by defini-
tion, it deprives them of resources without any offsetting 
benefits. For this reason, state governments routinely use 
their political power to resist commandeering and other "un-
funded mandates."245 
By extension, they are unlikely to choose not to resist comman-
deering unless it promises substantial offsetting benefits. 
Although a detailed account of the mechanics is beyond the 
scope of this Article, we can imagine at least the rough sketch 
in which a state's legislature, representing the people in their 
corporate capacity,246 could directly waive the state's anti-
commandeering entitlement or statutorily authorize the gover-
nor to negotiate on behalf of the people as needed. If there was 
no waiver, the anti-commandeering entitlement would remain 
with the state and could be judicially enforced against federal 
overreaching.247 If a given instance of commandeering bargain-
ing were challenged, the court would evaluate the permissibili-
ty of the trade based on the litigants' showing that bargaining 
is appropriately within the gray area, or that the regulatory 
244. A different case arises if all the states but one agree on a policy, and the 
majority persuades Congress to pass a commandeering rule that the dissenting 
state could challenge under a property rule approach. 
245. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 119. 
246. See supra note 152 (discussing the Court's explication of the Tenth 
Amendment reference to "the people"). 
247. Note that by this account of a valid waiver, the New York defendants may 
not have been able to satisfy the test for waiver even if one had been made availa-
ble (since neither the legislature nor the governor acted formally). Similarly, the 
federal government would not have been able to defend against the Printz com-
mandeering challenge, because states had not been given an opportunity ex ante 
to opt in or out. 521 U.S. at 935. However, were the waiver rule available and 
clear, then the parties could structure their behavior to secure clear and legally 
adequate waiver beforehand where intended. 
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partnership addresses an interjurisdictional problem on which 
both sides claim obligation or expertise (and perhaps for which 
alternative avenues of resolution are unavailing).248 Allowing 
bargaining while placing the burden of persuasion on the bar-
gainers shows proper deference to the check-and-balance value 
while preventing it from overshadowing all other considera-
tions of good federalist governance. 
Making the change to a property rule would be a relatively 
simple jurisprudential fix, as the inalienability rule has not 
been visited by the Court since its articulation in New York. 
Although the rule remains in force, the Court's reasoning on 
this aspect of the decision has not been invoked in any subse-
quent decision, such that it has not become an inextricable part 
of the fabric of the rest of our jurisprudence. Reversing the in-
alienability rule would leave other precedents protecting state 
sovereignty fully intact, while affording flexibility for intergo-
vernmental bargaining that should not offend them. 
In the end, the New York rule simply went farther than 
necessary. Enabling commandeering bargaining resonates 
with Justice Blackmun's argument in Garcia u. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority249 that states' rights are pro-
tected by the political process in which state actors play an im-
portant role, but the continued enforceability of the anti-
commandeering entitlement when it is not waived preserves 
the role of judicially enforceable federalism constraints. 
Meanwhile, affording judicial review to contain bargaining 
within the gray area should satisfy concerns that Tenth 
Amendment bargaining will not encroach on the uncontrover-
sial realms of purely state or federal authority. In this respect, 
the property rule approach would forge a middle path through 
the extremes of the Court's erstwhile vacillating Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Of note, the property rule approach would also free the 
federal government to waive its reciprocal Tenth Amendment 
entitlement-but that already happens with so much frequency 
248. Like Federalism and the Tug of War Within, Ryan, supra note 2, at 570, 
this Article does not resolve the absolute boundaries of the interjurisdictional gray 
area. That we can identify clear examples within it should suffice to reject a cate· 
gorical rule premised on its absence. This discussion preserves for later the in· 
evitable arguments over whether a given instance of bargaining takes place in the 
gray area where it should be permitted or the poles where it should not be. Nev-
ertheless, the current conversation at least steers the debate into more useful 
theoretical territory. Id. at 570--72. 
249. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
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and so little ado that affirming it is of almost no consequence 
except to bring the system back into symmetry.250 The "marble 
cake" model of cooperative federalism,251 representing the in-
numerable places across the regulatory landscape where feder-
al and state jurisdiction really do overlap, is mostly composed 
of areas where the federal government could but does not 
choose to fully preempt state involvement.252 This is visible not 
only in such purposeful collaborative initiatives as the Clean 
Air and Clean Water Acts, where the federal and state gov-
ernments take responsibility for separate but interlocking 
parts of a unified regulatory program,253 but also in the concur-
rent jurisdictional fabric of American law more generally.254 
(For example, bankruptcy law is constitutionally enumerated 
250. See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60-153 (Daniel J. 
Elazar ed., 1966). 
251. !d. 
252. For example, Congress has created a regime of shared federal and state 
authority over the coastal waterways three miles seaward from a state's coastal 
boundary. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 
(2006), offers federal funding and legal regard for state management of these wa· 
terways when states submit coastal management plans for approval by the De· 
partment of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA). When a coastal management plan is in effect, the federal government 
endeavors to comply with the state plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) ("Each Federal 
agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water 
use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which 
is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of 
approved State management programs."). The Act requires that federal activity 
affecting the coastal zone be consistent with that state's coastal management poli-
cies, in what the Department of Commerce has described as a "limited waiver of 
federal supremacy and authority." Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Con-
sistency Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 788, 789 (Jan. 5, 2006) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 
930). 
253. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006) (allocating roles be-
tween the EPA and the states); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006) (de-
legating standard setting authority to the federal government and program design 
and implementation to the states); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 567-83 (discuss-
ing regulatory crossover). 
254. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federaliza-
tion, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1382-85 (2006) (describing overlapping state and 
federal jurisdiction in products liability law); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm 
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1553-55 (2002) (describing 
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction in the context of criminal law); A. 
Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 
299-300 (2003) (discussing the advent of cooperative federal commercial laws, 
with particular emphasis on the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and 
the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 145 (2001) (noting 
''broad concurrent regulatory authority over the economy" by the state and federal 
governments); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 554-67 (discussing federalism, 
preemption, and the related reallocation of authority). 
2010] FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL 73 
to the federal government,255 but its administration depends on 
property law definitions and conclusions that differ from state 
to state.)256 Despite the challenge it poses to the separationist 
premise of the New Federalism's conception of dual sovereign-
ty, the federal government's frequent waiver of its Tenth 
Amendment entitlement has attracted little attention from the 
Court-presumably because the Court has not been concerned 
about a threat to the overall federal project posed by retained 
state power. 
Needless to say, the reverse is true: the Court clearly con-
siders unchecked federal power a threat to the overall project of 
retained state sovereign authority. It is for this reason that it 
protected the states' Tenth Amendment entitlement so pur-
posefully (and for this reason that the rest of this Article ad-
dresses only the states' entitlement, though the argument ap-
plies equally well to its federal counterpart). The inalienability 
rule the Court chose to protect Tenth Amendment state sove-
reign authority misses the mark, but the concerns that drove 
the choice suggest what the majority was really afraid of: the 
third leg in the Cathedral stool, the liability rule. 
2. Fear of "Liability" 
What the majority truly sought to prevent-and with gen-
erally good reason-was the adoption of a Cathedral liability 
rule. Under a liability rule, the jurisdictional competitor is 
empowered not only to bargain for the entitlement, but to swap 
compensation for it even over the holder's protest. It appears 
that the Court was so concerned about the threat of liability-
specifically, the threat of federal override of state prerogative-
that it remedially overcompensated. 
A liability approach would render a state's Tenth Amend-
ment entitlement vulnerable to the very kind of federal ag-
grandizement that the Court most fears. Protecting the Tenth 
Amendment entitlement under a liability rule would shift deci-
sion-making power about the entitlement to the jurisdictional 
competitor--empowering the federal government to condemn 
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
256. See, e.g., Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, 'Leap of Faith' into Bankruptcy: An 
Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese's 
Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 889 (2005) (noting that al-
though certain property interests are determined by federal bankruptcy stan-
dards, bankruptcy courts frequently ''look to state law for guidance in determining 
what constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate"). 
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the entitlement even over a state's protest (and vice versa), so 
long as the loser was somehow "made whole" by the appropria-
tor. The Cathedral authors recommend liability rules when 
there is both uncertainty about the initial allocation and high 
transaction costs that could prevent otherwise desirable en-
titlement shifting-a description that applies to state-federal 
bargaining in the gray area, which is complicated by uncertain-
ties and practicalities that exceed most private bargaining sce-
narios.257 But allowing the nonconsensual shifting of entitle-
ments to sovereign authority advances problem solving at too 
great a cost to other important federalism values, such as local 
autonomy and checks and balances. It would be better simply 
to remove some of the obstacles to bargaining that create high 
transaction costs in the gray area, which would bring the sce-
nario more in line with those that the Cathedral authors rec-
ommend for property rule protection. 
One could imagine rare circumstances in which a liability 
approach might be appropriate-perhaps where a serious inter-
jurisdictional emergency renders the bargaining process im-
possible (or intolerably harmful), as may have happened in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina.258 At the time, many argued that 
the federal government should have been able to federalize the 
Louisiana National Guard and assume command of local first 
responders even without gubernatorial permission because the 
emergency had so incapacitated the state apparatus that the 
relevant state actors might not have been able to take the 
needed steps to evaluate and instigate a waiver.259 Professor 
Neil Siegel has posed a similar thought-problem about a future 
terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11, where the substantive 
anti-commandeering rule would prevent the President from as-
suming command of local first responders to coordinate a cen-
tralized response without gubernatorial consent.260 (Reflecting 
257. See supra Part I.D. 
258. Siegel, supra note 103, at 1687-88; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, su-
pra note 225 (suggesting that liability-rule commandeering may be a useful regu-
latory device even in cases other than emergencies). 
259. See John Yoo, Editorial, Trigger Power, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5; 
Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to 
Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastro-
phe 14-19 (Univ. ofMd. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2006-37, 2006), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946207 (arguing that the President had clear au-
thority to intervene even before passage of the Warner Act). 
260. Siegel, supra note 103, at 1684-86. Another provocative case that some 
argue could warrant a liability approach has already materialized in the slower-
motion emergency context of catastrophic injury to children in automobiles. The 
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these concerns, the post-Katrina amendments to the Stafford 
Act may authorize exactly this kind of federal move.)261 But 
even in such compelling circumstances, naked federal com-
mandeering would be highly contentious. For all who argued 
that the federal government should have acted more forcefully 
during the Katrina response, others argued passionately that 
the federal government must not violate state sovereignty.262 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has urged states to require child-
ren aged four to eight to use booster seats because most are too large for the in-
fant restraints already required by law, but too small for conventional seatbelts to 
work effectively. Adam Hochberg, NTSB Puts Heat On States Without Booster 
Seat Laws (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyld=112884532&ft=1&f=1003. NTSB estimates 
that these children are nearly 60 percent more likely to suffer catastrophic injury 
in a car accident when they are not using a booster seat. Id. In light of these sta-
tistics, all states have passed laws requiring booster seats except Florida, Arizona, 
and South Dakota. State representatives in Florida and Arizona are attempting 
to pass booster seat legislation in the coming year, but the Governor of South Da-
kota recently vetoed his own legislature's successful booster seat bill on grounds 
that such decisions should be left to the family-despite ''heart-rending testimo-
ny" from parents of injured children who had not used booster seats because they 
were following the requirements of child restraint laws that they had assumed 
were designed for maximum protection. Id. When a governor vetoes a demon-
strated means of halting preventable child deaths in legislation that has been du-
ly approved by the state legislature, which expression of Tenth Amendment sove-
reignty should prevail? At one level, the answer is easy: state legislation must 
yield to the governor's veto, and a displeased electorate maintains the alternative 
of voting that governor out at the next election cycle. Still, the families of children 
injured in the intervening years may later consider it the sort of emergency that 
should have warranted NTSB override under an anti-commandeering liability 
rule. 
261. The failed response to Hurricane Katrina-partly the result of poor coor-
dination between the federal government and the incapacitated state and local 
governments in New Orleans-motivated the enactment of a federal law that 
enables the President to deploy the military in response to major domestic emer-
gencies without consent of the states involved. John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 
(2006); see also Greenberger, supra note 259, at 1-2 (arguing that the new law 
neither adds to nor subtracts from the President's existing powers but merely cla-
rifies them after uncertainty suggested during the Katrina emergency). 
262. Cf. Ed McClure, Letter to the Editor, In Times of Catastrophe, Responsi-
bility Starts at Local Level, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at 16A, availa-
ble at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/09/06/0pinion/In_times_of_catastrop.shtml 
(arguing that the state and local government should have been able to handle the 
emergency without more federal involvement); Robert J. Spratlin, Editorial, Bash 
Mayor, Governor for Katrina Response, not Bush, BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2005, at 6A (arguing that primary responsibility for the disaster re-
sponse lay with state and local officials, and that the federal government properly 
abstained from interfering absent invitation); Posting of Douglas L. Marriott to 
USA Today Opinion, http:/lblogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/09/keep-out-federa.html 
(Sept. 5, 2007, 12:07 EST) (arguing against further federal involvement in there-
covery effort because large bureaucracies are not effective in dealing with 
emergencies). 
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Neither is it clear how a liability-rule entitlement shift should 
be compensated in this context. 
A liability rule could stress the check-and-balance value of 
federalism beyond its breaking point, and we can safely pre-
sume that in almost all imaginable circumstances, a state that 
really needed federal assistance to protect public safety would 
simply ask for it-waiving its entitlement to federal noninter-
ference just as the property rule would encourage. Indeed, the 
specter of federal override of Tenth Amendment-protected 
state sovereign authority is what galvanized the New Federal-
ism revival in the first place.263 Although a liability rule enabl-
ing a jurisdictional competitor to claim an entitlement over the 
holder's protest might unduly threaten federalism checks and 
balances, a property rule that enabled the holder to choose for 
itself would not. The property rule approach honors state au-
tonomy and protects against federal coercion by keeping veto 
power in the hands of the entitlement holder-the states. 
Thus, even if the uncontroversial poles of purely state and 
federal authority were properly protected by an inalienability 
rule, the uncertain entitlements in the gray area are exactly 
those best protected by a pro-bargaining property rule. New 
Federalism proponents may rightly fear the use of a liability 
rule to protect the Tenth Amendment entitlement, which might 
enable the federal government to condemn areas of state juris-
diction as it can private property for an interstate-but a prop-
erty rule protects state autonomy by empowering the state as 
the ultimate decision maker. Because a state is unlikely to 
bargain away its entitlement against its own interests, the 
bargaining paradigm would protect the states against the 
threat of federal overreaching intended by American federal-
ism. And it would enable the kind of state-federal bargaining 
that could make the needed difference in the interjurisdictional 
gray area. 
B. The Court's Defense: Inalienable by Nature and 
Necessity 
The inalienability approach thus fails the recommenda-
tions of the Cathedral framework, but it also fails under the 
263. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 642 (discussing how New Federalism "arose out 
of concern that the predominant cooperative federalism model fails to adequately 
circumscribe federal authority" (emphasis added)); id. at 539-42 (discussing how 
the New Federalism seeks to better corral federal authority). 
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Court's own rationale in New York. With all the intellectual ri-
gor of an afterthought, the Court essentially defended the new 
inalienability rule on two grounds-by nature and by necessi-
ty-neither of them satisfying. First, it proclaimed the en-
titlement inalienable by its very nature, analogizing unsuccess-
fully to other rights that the state may not waive on behalf of 
individuals and to the inalienable horizontal separation of 
powers between Congress, the President, and the federal judi-
ciary. It also justified the inalienability rule on grounds of ne-
cessity, because the interests of a state's citizens and their 
elected representatives might differ too much to allow the lat-
ter to waive on behalf of the former in state-federal negotia-
tions-even though the interests of citizens and their elected 
officials in state sovereign authority are remarkably well-
aligned. Finally, the Court undermined its reasoning on both 
nature and necessity grounds by suggesting that the same 
elected officials who should not be able to waive their citizens' 
entitlement in negotiations with the federal government might 
nevertheless be able to do so in the negotiation with another 
state of an interstate compact. 
1. By Nature: An Inherently Inalienable 
Entitlement? 
The Court first grounded its inalienability approach in the 
very nature of the entitlement, grouping the anti-
commandeering rule with other rights that the state may not 
waive on behalf of citizens and to more structural constitution-
al features, such as the horizontal separation of powers.264 Ul-
timately, its comparison with other rights that states cannot 
waive is unhelpful, since those are rights that citizens hold 
against the state, an analogy that simply does not hold in the 
context of the Tenth Amendment entitlement to state sovereign 
authority. And though the comparison between horizontal and 
vertical separation of powers seems more compelling, the Court 
fails to distinguish why property-rule protection is somehow 
acceptable in other federalism contexts, such as its Eleventh 
Amendment and spending-power doctrines. 
As an initial matter, the decision forces us to consider 
whether the nature of the Tenth Amendment entitlement itself 
264. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). See supra note 161, 
for the full quotation. 
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requires that it be inalienable. Indeed, some constitutional en-
titlements are protected by an inalienability rule,265 and prob-
ably rightly so. For example, in defending Tenth Amendment 
inalienability, the Court analogized to the separation of powers 
between Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court,266 
which is (weakly) vindicated by the non-delegation doctrine 
(preventing Congress from abdicating its role to the execu-
tive)267 and the Chevron doctrine of administrative law (pre-
venting the judiciary from encroaching on executive and legis-
lative decision making).268 But even assuming strong 
protection for the inalienability of the horizontal separation of 
powers, the Court's analogy fails. 
Comparing the horizontal separation of legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial power with federalism's vertical separation of 
state and federal power is appealing at first blush, but ulti-
mately unsatisfying when considered in the full context of fede-
ralism entitlements that are treated as tradable. The same 
state sovereign authority considered sacrosanct under the New 
York rule is the subject of bargaining elsewhere, especially 
amidst the waivable reciprocal entitlements to regulatory non-
interference that are created in the interplay between the 
grants and limits on federal power.269 When the states yielded 
to a nationally mandated drinking age in exchange for federal 
highway funds, they bargained away an entitlement to a par-
ticular zone of sovereign authority free from federal inter-
ference. 270 When they accepted federal education funding in 
exchange for instituting a battery of standardized tests, they 
bargained away another such entitlement.271 If constitutional 
265. In addition to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery discussed 
earlier, see supra Part I.B., another example is the Guarantee Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 4, which guarantees each state a republican form of govern-
ment-though this alleged inalienability may be all bark and no bite, given the 
Court's long tradition of treating claims raised under the Clause as nonjusticiable. 
See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 184 (" '[I]t rests with Congress,' not the judiciary, 
'to decide what government is the established one in a State.'" (quoting Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. (7. How.) 1, 42 (1849))). 
266. See supra note 161. 
267. But see supra note 164 (discussing the Court's reluctance to enforce the 
non-delegation doctrine for the last 60 years, upholding all delegations to admin-
istrative agencies challenged on these grounds). 
268. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'! Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (holding that a federal agency's interpretation of its organic statute is en-
titled to "deference" from the court). 
269. See supra notes 7f:t--79 and accompanying text. 
270. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987). 
271. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2006). 
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law permits state-federal bargaining around Tenth Amend-
ment defined zones under the spending power, why should the 
states' Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering entitlement be 
different?272 Indeed, the majority's accompanying suggestion 
that Congress could work around the take-title commandeering 
problem by conditioning state waiver on federal funds implodes 
this line of reasoning.273 
Perhaps conscious of this weakness in its characterization 
of the Tenth Amendment entitlement as an immutable struc-
tural feature of the Constitution, the Court also characterized 
it as an individual right-reasoning that the entitlement is in-
alienable in state-federal bargaining because it belongs not to 
the state as a state, but to the individuals within the state. M-
ter acknowledging that the challenged terms of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act constituted a regulatory bargain 
in which New York was a willing beneficiary, the Court asked 
and then answered its own rhetorical question in terms of the 
individual interests in state sovereign authority. Returning to 
Justice O'Connor's reasoning: 
How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional in-
fringement of state sovereignty when state officials con-
sented to the statute's enactment? 
The answer follows from an understanding of the fun-
damental purpose served by our Government's federal 
structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereign-
ty of States for the benefit of the States or state govern-
ments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of 
the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, 
the Constitution divides authority between federal and 
state governments for the protection of individuals. State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism 
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffu-
sion of sovereign power."274 
Indeed, no one would argue that the Tenth Amendment does 
not protect individuals in this way, but the argument proves 
too much-because all constitutional directives exist to protect 
272. Noting this inconsistency, some scholars have argued that the New York 
entitlement is appropriately inalienable and the others under-protected. See su-
pra note 87. 
273. See supra Part II.C.2. 
274. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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individuals. Indeed, this is the very purpose of the Constitu-
tion; it is what each of its elements is ultimately designed, di-
rectly or indirectly, to accomplish. 
That it benefits individuals, then, is an unremarkable fea-
ture of the Tenth Amendment entitlement. But by invoking its 
relationship to individuals, the Court implicitly compared the 
entitlement to others in the Bill of Rights that establish clear 
individual rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial,275 the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
search and seizure,276 or even the First Amendment right to 
free speech.277 But even the fact that a constitutional entitle-
ment protects individuals does not necessitate an inalienability 
rule, since most constitutional rights-including each of those 
mentioned above-are protected under a property rule. 278 As 
described earlier, citizens frequently bargain away their right 
to jury trial for a plea agreement that better meets their inter-
ests,279 their right against unreasonable searches when they 
choose to cooperate with warrantless police,280 and their right 
to free speech when they accept government employment.281 Is 
there something else about the nature of Tenth Amendment 
state sovereign authority that justifies this inalienability? 
To be sure, most constitutional rights that are waivable 
under a property rule are not usually waived by the state, 
which makes sense, because they are mostly rights held by in-
dividual citizens against the state. The First Amendment en-
titles individuals to speak free from state interference, the 
Fourth Amendment entitles them to be free of unreasonable 
275. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
276. Id. amend. IV. 
277. I d. amend. I. 
278. See Merrill, supra note 12, at 1144 (asserting that a property rule governs 
the Sixth Amendment); id. at 1164 ("[T]he current regime of protection afforded to 
Fourth Amendment rights can be described as a foundational property rule sub-
ject to numerous exceptions where we follow what amounts to a police power 
rule."); Seamon, supra note 64, at 1135 n.325 (observing that constitutional rights 
are presumptively protected by property rules). 
279. In 2003, out of 83,530 defendants in United States District Courts, 74,850 
were convicted, 72,110 of whom entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003 423 tbl.5.22 (Ann L. Pastore 
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ 
pdflt522.pdf. 
280. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (observing that a citizen 
may willingly waive his rights and provide information that may aid a law en-
forcement effort). 
281. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (holding 
that a contract between the CIA and one of its employees was valid, even though 
it restricted his ability to publish a book about his work for the agency). 
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search and seizure by the state, and the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees them a fair trial before facing state punishment. 
But the Court's facile invocation of this principle in New York 
is dubious, because the Tenth Amendment entitlement-
though it may exist to protect individuals-is not like these 
other individual rights. The entitlement at issue in New York 
was not held by citizens against New York, or the state officials 
who might have waived it; if it was held against anything, that 
would have been the federal government. The states' Tenth 
Amendment entitlement, the mirror image of its reciprocal fed-
eral counterpart, benefits individuals by delineating a zone of 
sovereign authority protected against federal incursion. In this 
respect, it seems far less like the First or Fourth Amendment 
entitlement than it does its neighboring entitlement, the Ele-
venth Amendment entitlement to state sovereign immunity-a 
medium of state sovereign authority that the Court acknowl-
edges a state can waive.282 
The inalienability of the Tenth Amendment entitlement to 
state sovereign authority is difficult to reconcile with the freely 
alienable Eleventh Amendment entitlement to the same consti-
tutional medium. The Tenth Amendment protects a zone of lo-
cal regulatory authority, and the Eleventh Amendment pro-
tects the fiscal integrity of that level (and perhaps more in 
some philosophically significant way, in vindicating the state 
as a sovereign not subject to private suit283). While each bene-
fits individuals by empowering them locally within a federal 
system, neither is cognizable except as it attaches to the state 
as an institution of government. An individual citizen has no 
divisible interest in state regulatory authority, or in a state's 
treasury, except as stakeholders within that state. The Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendments are thus better understood (as, in-
deed, they usually are) as conferring collective rights, meaning-
fully administered by the states qua states, and not to individ-
uals.284 It is for this reason that they have been conventionally 
282. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). 
283. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[A]s the Constitution's 
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make 
clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty 
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which 
they retain today ... except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain 
constitutional Amendments."). 
284. For the most common statement of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments 
as distinct, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dis· 
senting) (stating that they are "examples" of the Framers' understanding "that 
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grouped together under the banner of "States' Rights," even 
though their underlying purposes may be to protect citizens 
from losing locally based legislative authority and from being 
forced as taxpayers to satisfy federal court judgments against 
their states. If state sovereign authority is alienable by state 
officials in the Eleventh Amendment context, it is hard to un-
derstand why it should not also be so in the Tenth Amendment 
context. 285 
Were the relationship to individual interests really the 
proper yardstick of inalienability that the Court proposes in 
New York, then the most logical arrangement would be there-
verse: the Eleventh Amendment should be the inalienable of 
the pair, since that one can be much more closely connected 
with the protection of discrete individuals' interests than the 
Tenth Amendment entitlement. Discrete individual taxpayers 
bear the brunt of legal liability for judgments against their 
states, and all else equal, citizens prefer lower to higher tax-
es-so at least all taxpayers would have a substantially paral-
lel interest in how the Eleventh Amendment entitlement is 
used or waived. It is much harder to trace a direct relationship 
between use or waiver of the sovereign authority protected by 
Tenth Amendment and the interests of discrete individuals, 
due to the inevitable policy dissensus among them about how 
that authority is used.286 (Demonstrating the breadth of con-
the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative 
authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was 
competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it 
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation"). 
285. One could argue that the difference in property-and inalienability-rule 
protection can be justified by the fact that the Eleventh Amendment is framed as 
a limit on federal power (which the states can waive) and the Tenth as affirming 
some reserve of state or people power (which the state cannot waive). However, it 
is not clear the Tenth Amendment is really framed differently from the Eleventh 
in this regard, since it also represents a limit on federal power, even if it does so 
by affirming that reservoir of authority not delegated to the federal government. 
More importantly, each amendment creates by its phrasing what amounts to a 
reciprocal set of "Hohfeldian" rights and duties. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 
16, 28-58 (1913). The Eleventh Amendment limitation on federal judicial power 
is what creates the meaningful state entitlement to sovereign immunity, just as 
the Tenth Amendment's reciprocal affirmation of state and federal jurisdictional 
zones is what suggests the importance of some distinction between them. The 
Court could hardly justify so important a difference on the basis of so weak a dis-
tinction in phrasing. 
286. There may also be policy dissensus among individual citizens about 
whether a given suit against their state is worth paying for despite the possibility 
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, this dissensus proceeds 
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flicting interests among statewide electorates is the aforemen-
tioned nonexistence of unanimous elections and referenda at 
the state level.)287 
Moreover, though all citizens may have a parallel interest 
in protecting local authority, it is disputable that preventing 
the waiver of the entitlement at issue in New York even pro-
tected local authority: where the rubber of that entitlement re-
ally hits the road in each case depends on the specific authority 
and how it would be used or traded, which will always be dif-
ferent. Citizens' interests are much more uniform under the 
Eleventh Amendment, where they are unified around issues of 
finances and judicial process.288 Numerous federal courts have 
invoked the centrality of the treasury-protective role by which 
the Eleventh Amendment benefits individual citizens' pocket-
books,289 while New York remains the only Tenth Amendment 
decision to characterize the entitlement as a protection for in-
dividuals that states may not waive.290 
from a baseline shared interest among citizens in the fiscal security of their state, 
several steps removed in comparison to such baseline indeterminacy about how 
Tenth Amendment regulatory authority is wielded. 
287. See supra Part II.C (discussing the impossibility of uniform waiver of the 
Tenth Amendment entitlement). 
288. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Ra-
ther than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1129 (1983) 
(noting that "the traditional core of eleventh amendment protection" is to avoid 
"the award of money judgments against the states"). 
289. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39, 48 (1994) 
(noting that "the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment" was "the prevention of 
federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury," and offering 
a litany of preceding appeals court opinions that "have recognized the vulnerabili-
ty of the State's purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment deter-
minations"). Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("The 
Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to 'preven[t] federal-court 
judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury'; it also serves to avoid 'the 
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the 
instance of private parties.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; P.R. 
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993))). 
290. In New York, Justice O'Connor cites to Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 759 (1991), as precedent for this proposition, but the case provides dubious 
support: Coleman was a habeas case that dealt with the ability of the federal 
court to grant habeas relief that had been denied by the state court, and the 
statement cited is not part of the majority opinion she authored but instead part 
of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. See New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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2. By Necessity: The Agent-Accountability Problem 
The Court's other main rationale for the New York inalie-
nability rule centers on the problems of trust and accountabili-
ty that arise between citizens and their agents in government. 
The majority justified the inalienability rule as one of necessi-
ty, fearing that constituents might be confused by the inter-
governmental bargaining it prohibits and that the interests of 
elected officials may depart too significantly from that of their 
electorates to warrant power to waive their constituents' en-
titlement.291 However, both the empirical and theoretical 
bases of the Court's accountability concerns are flawed. 
First, the majority worried that enabling state legislators 
to bargain with Congress this way would undermine the ac-
countability value of federalism, highlighting citizens' need to 
monitor the effectiveness of their representation in state and 
federal government (and take corrective action as needed).292 
When state legislators bind themselves under federal law in 
negotiations with Congress, the Court explained, they make it 
harder for constituents to know whom to blame if they do not 
like the resulting laws.293 However, this argument has been 
roundly criticized for resting on the unsupported empirical 
premises that (1) voters cannot tell what level of government is 
to blame for a given policy, and (2) state and local officials are 
unable to tell them when the fault truly lies in Washington.294 
The Court's reasoning assumes that voters are either unable to 
understand interaction between the federal and state govern-
ments and/or that they cannot voice corrective preferences 
through their federal representation, though significant evi-
dence suggests otherwise.295 (For example, warned by their 
state representatives that the federal government was increa-
singly requiring their states to implement "unfunded man-
dates," voters persuaded their federal representatives to reign 
in the practice by passing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
of 1995.)296 
291. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. 
292. Id. at 168-69 (noting that "where the Federal Government compels States 
to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished" by 
making it harder for voters to keep track of who is responsible for which policies). 
293. Id. 
294. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable 
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 877 (1999). 
295. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 606-10. 
296. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S. C.§§ 1501-1571 (2006). 
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More significant was the majority's deep concern that state 
officials cannot be trusted with the power to waive an entitle-
ment that truly belongs to the citizens, who might have distinct 
interests from their elected representatives.297 This is a more 
formidable concern, as the personal interests of elected officials 
and those of the constituents they represent can never be com-
pletely aligned. Nevertheless, while this gap between the in-
terests of principals and agents is endemic in all fields where 
primary interest holders are represented by others, the gap is 
actually less problematic in the anti-commandeering context 
than in others that the Court seems to accept as a consequence 
of our representational democracy. 
The problem that the New York decision identifies-that 
state representatives may not faithfully execute the best Tenth 
Amendment interests of their citizens298_is a species of the 
well-researched genera of what negotiation theorists call the 
principal-agent tension.299 The principal-agent tension is 
created by the subtle disconnects between the personal inter-
ests of the principal and her bargaining agent that pervade all 
negotiations carried on by representatives.300 For example, an 
agent paid by the hour may proceed more deliberately than if 
paid a flat fee, even if the principal is more interested in speed 
in the first case or care in the second. Voters' interests may 
best be served by tackling a thorny dilemma as soon as possi-
ble, but their elected official might ignore opportunities until 
after the election to mitigate the personal costs of any political 
fallout. Thus, although this aspect of the agent-accountability 
problem is a valid concern, it is also one that applies to all leg-
islative products of elected representation (including the sorts 
of state legislative decision making that the Court approves in 
297. New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83 (noting the "possibility that powerful incen-
tives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the feder-
al structure to be in their personal interests"). 
298. See id. 
299. See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 69-91 (2000) (describing the principal-agent ten-
sion); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 287 
(Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003) (1942) (describing how a "government's depen-
dence" upon voting "forces upon the men at or near the helm a short-run view''); 
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 90 (arguing that judicially enforceable fede-
ralism constraints are needed because elected state officials will consent to fede-
ralism violations against the interests of their constituents, though conceding that 
this problem is least severe in the anti-commandeering context). 
300. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 299, at 75-76. 
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opposition to Tenth Amendment bargaining).301 Should this 
particular context of state-federal bargaining be different? 
The Court clearly thought so, heralding the vertical sepa-
ration of powers as a cornerstone of American federalism, but 
closer analysis belies the proposition. If anything, this context 
is the one in which we can least fear the distorting effects of the 
principal-agent tension because the nature of Tenth Amend-
ment state sovereign authority affords the greatest overlap be-
tween the private interests of individual citizens and their 
elected representatives, whose only claim to power lies in that 
very authority. Both citizens and state officials benefit by re-
taining as much local authority as possible, except when the 
problem they wish to resolve requires as constrained a sacrifice 
of this authority as possible.302 But state representatives will 
be particularly jealous of Tenth Amendment-protected state 
authority; if they were too free in bargaining away these en-
titlements, they would soon find themselves out of work.303 (If 
anything, we might fear the reverse problem-in which the cit-
izens would benefit from waiver of an entitlement that the rep-
resentative refuses to alienate-but this was clearly not the 
Court's concern.) 
Meanwhile, we trust elected state representatives to make 
legislative trade-offs against all sorts of other constitutionally 
protected interests that are valued much differently at the in-
dividual and state level, where the principal-agent tension is 
much more pronounced. State legislatures can pass laws that 
constitutionally burden individual citizens' free speech (as nar-
rowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions), even 
though those are speech rights specifically held against the 
government.304 Similarly, state legislatures pass laws that 
burden their citizens' equal protection interests all the time, 
and they can do so on any rational basis so long as no protected 
class is implicated.305 It is much more likely that there could 
301. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (arguing that Congress may negotiate with 
state governments to achieve federal goals rather than compel state performance). 
302. See supra note 175 (analogizing to the contract law principle that we bind 
ourselves to promises that compromise our autonomy when the autonomy· 
enhancing benefits of being bound outweigh the initial outlay). 
303. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing that state· 
federal collusion is unlikely in an anti-commandeering context). 
304. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972) (holding 
that reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of free speech may be neces· 
sary to further significant governmental interests). 
305. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). 
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be a gap between the interests of individual citizens and their 
state representatives in vindicating these more classic individ-
ual rights because-as previously discussed-these are rights 
that individual citizens hold against the state. Yet in these 
contexts, where the principal-agent tension is that much more 
palpable, we do not hesitate to allow the state to burden them 
by the legislative decision making of elected representatives. 
By contrast, when legislators bargain with their state's so-
vereign authority-the precious commodity that is the basis for 
their own authority to legislate about anything-we can feel 
comparatively secure that they will share their constituents' 
interests in conservatism. The principal-agent tension will al-
ways be most pressing when the right in question is one exer-
cised by individuals one at a time against the state, and less so 
as the right is more cognizable as a collective one, like those 
described by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. An en-
titlement to legislative decision making seems far from the pre-
rogative of any one individual citizen, even though individual 
citizens benefit from it collectively. Even those who defend the 
need for judicially enforceable federalism constraints on prin-
cipal-agent grounds (worrying that state officials will sell out 
their constituents' interest in state sovereignty for careerist 
gains) acknowledge that the lack of potential for officials' per-
sonal gain in negotiating around commandeering constraints 
fortifies this bargaining realm against a threat more pressing 
in other federalism contexts.306 
Whether the Tenth Amendment entitlement protects an 
individual or a collective right, the close overlap between citi-
zens' and representatives' interests in their states' sovereign 
authority means that Tenth Amendment bargaining will be 
more resistant to the distorting effects of the principal-agent 
tension than most other legislative arenas in which elected offi-
cials make trade-offs against constitutionally protected rights. 
Moreover, the Court's solutions to the problem it identifies-
state legislative decision making about federal proposals for 
spending-power deals or cooperate-or-be-preempted choic-
es307_invite the same kinds of principal-agent conflicts in ne-
gotiations that further strain accountability. These problems 
306. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 119. However, these authors never-
theless support the inalienability of the anti-commandeering entitlement. Id. at 
118-20. 
307. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1992). 
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make it hard to understand what the inalienability rule pro-
vides that is preferable to a property rule approach. 
3. The State Compact Problem 
Finally, the majority's defense of the Tenth Amendment 
inalienability rule on both nature and necessity grounds was 
substantially undermined by dicta implying that even though 
New York State could not waive its citizens' entitlement to the 
federal government in negotiating a resolution to the crisis, it 
might have succeeded in doing so had it joined an interstate 
compact and waived the same sovereign authority directly to 
other states.308 The decision suggests (without deciding) that 
the disputed take-title provision-which the majority consi-
dered part of the Act requiring the formation of interstate 
waste disposal compacts but not part of the interstate compacts 
themselves309_might have been binding had New York prom-
ised to abide by the provision within the actual terms of an in-
terstate compact it joined pursuant to the Act: 
Nor does the State's prior support for the Act estop it 
from asserting the Act's unconstitutionality. While New 
York has received the benefit of the Act in the form of a few 
more years of access to disposal sites in other States, New 
York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact. 
Any estoppel implications that might flow from membership 
in a compact thus do not concern us here. The fact that the 
Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise 
among the States does not elevate the Act (or the antece-
dent discussions among representatives of the States) to the 
status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress' ap-
proval under the Compact Clause. That a party collabo-
rated with others in seeking legislation has never been un-
derstood to estop the party from challenging that legislation 
in subsequent litigation.310 
The Court's conclusion that the states' earlier negotiations did 
not rise to the level of a compact is unremarkable, but the im-
plications of the passage are striking. The suggestion that New 
York's lawsuit might have been estopped had the state bar-
308. ld. at 183. 
309. Even this is a disputed point; in his dissent, Justice White interpreted the 
relevant interstate compacts as incorporating the Act's take-title provision by ref-
erence. Id. at 194-96 (White, J., dissenting). 
310. Id. at 183 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
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gained away its sovereign authority with other states rather 
than the federal government betrays the heart of the Court's 
rationale that state officials may not waive an entitlement that 
does not belong to them. If the entitlement is inalienable by 
state officials to Congress because it really belongs to individu-
al citizens, how could it nevertheless be alienable by state offi-
cials to the officials of another state?311 If the entitlement be-
longs to the citizens, what difference does it make whether the 
sovereign to whom their elected officials waive it is the federal 
or a separate state government?312 
The discrepancy casts doubt on the Court's assertion that 
the Tenth Amendment entitlement is inalienable because it 
protects individuals. It is unclear why a state could waive an 
individual entitlement by joining a compact that requires con-
gressional approval, but not after negotiating for the same 
waiver in direct congressional legislation independent of the 
compact. The same rights are at stake in both contexts, and 
the interstate-compact medium certainly does not enable states 
to waive other constitutional rights held by individuals. For 
example, the New England states could not form an interstate 
compact to deny residency status to minorities, even with con-
gressional consent,313 nor could the southeastern states form a 
compact to deny members of the Republican Party the right to 
speak in a public forum.314 But that is the absurd implication 
of the Court's suggestion that the result of the case might have 
311. We might also consider the perverse implications were the Court to choose 
consistency by holding that a state could not waive its sovereign authority in ei-
ther context: a compact like the ones embedded within the Act would be imper-
missible, no matter the need. However, the proposition is undermined by the ex-
istence of hundreds of interstate compacts in which states do waive some degree 
of Tenth Amendment sovereignty to other states or to an interstate commission. 
See, e.g., Klamath River Basin Compact of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-222, 71 Stat. 497, 
502-05 (1957); Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, MINN. STAT. § 
243.1605 (2008); Interstate Compact for Juveniles, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 8-368 
to -368.01 (2003). 
312. Note that New York did not definitively decide that a state could waive its 
Tenth Amendment protected sovereign authority by joining a compact, only that it 
might be able to do so. 505 U.S. at 183. The decision suggests that had New York 
joined a compact in which the take-title penalty was made an explicit part, then 
its bid to be released from the bargain might have been vitiated by an estoppel 
claim unavailable in the context of challenging federal legislation. But would en-
tering into a compact under one part of the Act imply consent to another part that 
is otherwise unconstitutional? 
313. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting state action that discriminates 
on the basis of race). 
314. Cf id. amend. I (prohibiting state action that interferes with citizens' po-
litical speech). 
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been different had New York followed the other of the two 
permissible paths outlined by the Act-had it joined a compact 
that required it to site a facility, rather than attempting to site 
an in-state facility on its own. 
The best counterargument is probably that the relevant 
Tenth Amendment entitlement is not really a positive one for a 
zone of state sovereign authority but a negative one against 
federal interference with that authority. If this were so, the 
state could waive the same sovereign authority to interference 
by another state without triggering the citizens' separate en-
titlement to federal noninterference in that zone of state au-
thority. Under this analysis, the question really becomes one 
about the content of the Tenth Amendment entitlement: re-
gardless of who has the power to waive it, is the entitlement 
really about a zone of state sovereign authority that cannot be 
interfered with by any outside sovereign, including another 
state (we can call this the "positive entitlement"), or about a 
prohibition on federal interference in state affairs ("the nega-
tive entitlement")? But in fact, and as suggested in the earlier 
references to the Hohfeldian framing of the Tenth and Ele-
venth Amendments,3l5 neither depiction of the entitlement tru-
ly stands without the other. Indeed, this is exactly what the 
Court tells us in New York: 
In a case like these, involving the division of authority be-
tween federal and state governments, the two inquiries are 
mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Con-
gress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly 
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a 
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitu-
tion has not conferred on Congress.316 
The existence of the positive entitlement's zone of state ju-
risdiction implies at least a presumption of federal noninterfe-
rence, while the negative entitlement's restriction is meaning-
315. See supra note 285. 
316. 505 U.S. at 156; see also id. at 159 ("In the end, just as a cup may be half 
empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue 
in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Fed-
eral Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of 
discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth 
Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged 
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority."); id. at 177. 
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less unless it refers to noninterference within a specific zone of 
state sovereign authority. So any answer to this question must 
include both a positive and negative component, and the only 
question is whether the negative component protects state so-
vereign authority from interference by any outside sovereign, 
or only the federal government. 
In Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I argue that the 
best understanding of the entitlement is as a (positive) jurisdic-
tional zone of sovereign authority coupled with a (negative) 
presumption against interference by the jurisdictional competi-
tor that may be overcome in the interjurisdictional gray area 
where state and federal zones may occasionally overlap.3I7 
Overcoming the presumption requires demanding scrutiny un-
der a standard that weighs the overall harms and benefits to 
all federalism values. By this view, any entitlement to nonin-
terference is strong at the two uncontroversial ends of the 
state-federal jurisdictional spectrum (constituting the vast ma-
jority of the total), but weak in the gray area. Federalism and 
the Tug of War Within did not consider jurisdictional competi-
tion that might come from beyond the state-federal continuum 
(i.e., another state), but the relevant inquiry seems the same: 
whether the waiver of sovereign authority in any case would 
advance or detract from the fundamental federalism values 
that give meaning to the Tenth Amendment. 
Regardless, the Court's reasoning in New York fails to re-
solve the problem. If a state may not waive its citizens' en-
titlement to the federal government but may to another state, 
the Court must assume that the only relevant entitlement is 
the negative entitlement to federal noninterference. But as es-
tablished above, this elides the positive entitlement to a zone of 
state sovereign authority that must accompany the negative 
entitlement. If the state can still trade on the positive entitle-
ment with the right bargaining partner, then this contradicts 
the Court's stated characterization of the entitlement not as a 
state prerogative but as a right belonging to individual citizens, 
which would seem to deserve protection from trade to either 
the federal government or any another sovereign state. 
On a pragmatic level, it is also worth noting that limiting a 
state's ability to bargain with its sovereign authority to the sole 
arena of interstate compacts would make it harder for inter-
state compacts to be effective because interstate compacts (like 
317. Ryan, supra note 2, at 658-67. 
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international laws) are easy to get out of and thus hard to en-
force.318 No matter what states may promise upon entering a 
compact, they can generally withdraw from compacts simply by 
repealing their own enacting state legislation, leaving compact-
ing states vulnerable to strategic bargaining moves that may 
ultimately undermine the accomplishment of interstate bar-
gaining goals. Indeed, this is exactly what New York State 
sought to do in the case of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act: it took advantage of the Act's initial benefits (ex-
tended deadlines enabling it to use South Carolina as a low-
cost radioactive-waste dumping ground for an additional twelve 
years) until the bargain no longer seemed appealing, then left 
its partner states holding the proverbial bag. The unfairness of 
New York's behavior offends common law contract sensibilities, 
which may be why the Court held open the possibility that New 
York might be held to account for its strategic behavior by a 
state within the breached compact, even if not by the federal 
government suing for violation of the underlying federallaw.3 19 
And, indeed, when the Act's compacts were uncoupled from the 
independently enforceable take-title threat, it failed to deliver 
on its goal of creating a national network of disposal sites.320 
Could the scheme have worked if the take-title penalty had 
simply been included in each individual compact? Probably 
not. Interstate compacts are adopted as state law, so including 
the take-title provision directly in each compact would have 
given the penalty independent legal effect in each participating 
state by that state's own law. However, most states were al-
ready failing to comply with their own laws that adopted the 
other terms of the compacts-most conspicuously, in failing to 
create the mandated disposal sites321-which is why the penal-
ties were needed to begin with. Including penalties in the 
compacts but not the independently enforceable federal law 
suggests two problems. First, there remains the probability of 
ongoing nonadherence to state law and the difficulty of inter-
318. Cf. John Samples, A Critique of the National Popular Vote Plan for Elect-
ing the President, CATO POL 'y ANALYSIS SERIES No. 622 (Cato lnst., Wash., D.C.), 
Oct. 13, 2008, at 12-13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462303 (criticizing 
a state compact-based proposal to elect the President by popular vote (and thus 
without amending the Constitution) because states could always withdraw from 
the compact before the election if polling data jarred state representatives). 
319. New York, 505 U.S. at 183. 
320. See supra Part Il.A (reviewing the goals and history of the Act). 
321. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Cent. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact 
Comm'n, 187 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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state enforcement. Worse is the possibility that this approach 
could encourage even less compliance with the overall scheme, 
by motivating states to refrain from compacts altogether to 
avoid vulnerability to the penalty. 
Providing an incentive for states to pull out of the com-
pacts they had joined would lead them right back to the collec-
tive-action problem that inspired the state-based low-level ra-
dioactive waste solution in the first place. Removing the 
externally enforceable penalty thus defeated the intentions of 
the states that designed the system adopted by the Act. If pe-
nalties are limited to the language of interstate compacts be-
cause Congress cannot enact them even with states' consent, 
then enforcement problems could undermine interstate com-
pacting goals altogether. A separately enforceable provision 
with teeth may be necessary to contain the collective-action 
problems that inhibit full participation and enforcement. In-
deed, these kinds of freeloader and holdout problems are exact-
ly the sort of collective-action problems that Calabresi and Me-
lamed cite in support of remedy rules that enable bargaining 
regimes to realize efficient results.322 
In the end, perhaps the best way to understand the New 
York inalienability rule is in the very terms that the Cathedral 
framework identifies in support of inalienability: it exists to 
protect a "moralism" that the Court considered worthy of the 
resulting efficiency and autonomy losses.323 But identifying 
what is really driving the rule opens the decision up to proper 
public scrutiny about that choice, scrutiny it fails to withstand. 
CONCLUSION: THE WRONG MORALISM 
Weak on its own theoretical terms, the Court's defense of 
the New York inalienability rule is ultimately best explained in 
Cathedral terms. Calabresi and Melamed suggest that an in-
alienability rule is often only justifiable to vindicate a strong 
"moralism"-a policymaking consensus about some value so 
important that it is worth protecting in spite of the resulting 
efficiency and autonomy losses.324 The Tenth Amendment in-
alienability rule has proven costly in efficiency and autonomy 
terms, but it faithfully protects the moralism that underlies the 
322. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1106-10. 
323. See id. at 1093-98. 
324. Id. at 1112; see also Merrill, supra note 12, at 1150, 1156 (discussing a 
public law version of this principle). 
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New Federalism paradigm. The Court's reasoning in New York 
suggests that it considers the protection of mutual exclusivity 
in state and federal jurisdiction so important that the bright-
line boundary New Federalism draws between them-policed 
by the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause-must be 
protected even when the parties wish to bridge it, at whatever 
practical cost.325 Consistent with the rest of the New Federal-
ism jurisprudence, it exalts the check-and-balance value above 
all other federalism considerations, including local autonomy, 
interjurisdictional innovation, and interjurisdictional problem 
solving. 
Federalism values represent a legitimate moralism in the 
Tenth Amendment context. But is the check-and-balance value 
behind the inalienability rule the right moralism-that is, the 
only federalism value that should count in the analysis? Per-
haps at the purely state and federal ends of the spectrum 
(where intergovernmental bargaining is not necessary), but not 
in the interjurisdictional gray area-where problem-solving 
values are in heightened tension with checks and balances, be-
cause the assignment of a regulatory problem to one or the oth-
er jurisdictional realm is unproductive toward its resolution. 
The New Federalism's mutually exclusive jurisdictional 
spheres are essentially arbitrary at their margins, presenting 
exactly the case the Cathedral authors make for when an en-
titlement-shifting rule is necessary: when there is significant 
uncertainty about where to assign the initial entitlement. In 
the end, bargaining might be the best way to honor all relevant 
federalism values simultaneously-from checks to localism to 
problem solving-because a state would not pragmatically shift 
its entitlement to sovereign authority against its own interests. 
Allowing states to bargain with their entitlements-and, signif-
icantly, to lead in the intergovernmental negotiating process-
strengthens the role of the states in the federal system while 
opening up regulatory possibilities for dealing with issues on 
which neither side can be the proverbial "least cost avoider" on 
its own. 
325. The majority effectively acknowledged that its opinion was driven by this 
concern in its discussion of the purposes of dividing state and federal authority. 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992) ("'Just as the separation 
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and Federal Government will reduce the risk of ty-
ranny and abuse from either front.'" (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991))). 
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In previous work, I have argued that the New Federalism 
has undermined the balance between competing federalism 
values that have long served our system of government, and 
suggested that federalism theory evolve toward a model that 
better mediates between them.326 But even if that route is 
never taken, this Article shows how a modest modification of a 
jurisprudentially created remedy rule could help relieve the 
tension building in the gray area. Even taking the rest of the 
New Federalism jurisprudence as it stands, the Court should 
retreat from the New York inalienability approach and protect 
the substantive anti-commandeering rule with a property rule 
that would enable consensual state-federal bargaining, facili-
tating the negotiation of novel regulatory partnerships in the 
gray area while respecting state autonomy. State sovereignty 
should include the ability to bargain. 
If the anti-commandeering entitlement is the proper sub-
ject of bargaining, does that mean that states should be able to 
bargain away any fundamental aspect of sovereignty? Of 
course not. Ultimately, we evaluate whether a federalism en-
titlement should be waivable in the same terms as any other 
constitutional entitlement: if allowing remedial waiver would 
undercut the purpose of the normative element of the rule, 
then the entitlement should be treated as inalienable. For ex-
ample, allowing a state to waive its equal suffrage in the Se-
nate would undercut the representational ethic of Article I. Al-
lowing Congress to redraw state boundaries would undermine 
the federalism values that give the Tenth Amendment its 
meaning to begin with. But allowing remedial waiver of the 
anti-commandeering entitlement-at least in the interjurisdic-
tional gray area-advances those values more faithfully than 
any of the alternatives. 
326. See Ryan, supra note 2. 
